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ABSTRACT 
New Zealand's education framework allows religion a varied place in school . Whereas no restrictions 
are placed on religious education of a 'secular' nature, religious activities that are designed to 
indoctrinate can occur in differing circumstances, as dictated by the type of school in which they are 
held: in state p1imary schools, education must be secular except for an optional period of about 30 
minutes a week; in integrated schools , general classes can reflect schools' religious character; and in 
private schools and state secondary schools, only indirect limits are placed on religious instruction and 
observance through the demands of teaching a (suitable) curriculum. This arrangement is the result of 
(colonial) New Zealand's Judeo-Christian heritage. In 2006, however, the country's social fabric has 
radically changed. This paper explores whether the cun-ent education framework is appropriate in the 
context ofa multicultural society. In particular, it considers whether the scheme is consistent with the 
religious freedom and anti-discrimination provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The 
prima facie breaches raised by the education mi-angements are identified. Because the legislative 
provisions under which they occur are unambiguous, they are not able to be interpreted so as to place a 
lesser limitation on the rights. The issue thus becomes whether the prima facie breaches are justified in 
a free and democratic society. Various political and philosophical arguments are considered, with the 
analysis ultimately grounded on a theory inspired by the liberal thinker Will Kymlicka. The paper 
concludes with a two-fold recommendation for legal refom1: first , religious instruction and 
observances should be excluded from state schools; second, the state should fully fund integrated 
schools (which are allowed to hold such activities). This proposal would result in a situation where 
culturally appropriate education is available for all. 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 16 800 words. 
Education - Religious Instruction and Observance - Secular - Education Act 1969 - Private Schools 
Conditional Integration Act 1975 - Education Act 1989 - Bill of Rights Act 1990 
I INTRODUCTION 
Education is a powerful factor in the construction of society. While it is 
mandato1y for only a finite window in children's lives, its impact extends far beyond 
this period to shape their values and objectives. No wonder, then, that religion's place 
in education is so contested. Children's exposure to religion in schools constitutes far 
more than a fleeting experience; it represents a significant fonnative influence. To 
secure a place for religion in education, it would seem, is to secure a place for 
religion in the future. 
The degree of contention that su1rnunds religion in schools was never more 
evident than during the recent furore over religious instruction and observances in 
state prima1y schools. In response to a "modest stream" of public complaints, 1 
Ministiy of Education ('the Ministiy') officials infonned Parliament's Education and 
Science Committee in August that new guidelines about religious activities were soon 
to be released. Among other things, these guidelines were to counsel against 'whole 
of school' religious activities, suggest that religious activities are best provided 
outside nonnal school hours, and replace the cuJTent exemption scheme (whereby 
students are 'opted out' of religious content) with an 'opt-in' model. 2 By early 
September, however, the government had "backed down" on the proposals. 3 This 
reversal occuJTed in the face of strong c1iticism from Anglican archbishops, who 
maintained that the guidelines would encroach upon parents' 1ight to shape their 
children's religious beliefs. 4 That the Minist1y should yield to pressure with such 
alac1ity demonstrates the political sensitivity with which it feels that the issue must be 
treated. 
1 
Grant Fleming "Assembly prayers illegal, schoo ls to be told" (23 August 2006) The Ne\V Zealand 
Herald. 
2 Fleming, above n I . 
3 
En-ol Kiang "Government backs down on prayer rules" (4 September 2006) The New Zealand 
Herald. 
4 Kiang, above n 3. 
4 
Removed as it is from the political realm, this paper has the capacity to 
consider in a detached manner religion's place in New Zealand schools in light of the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 ('the BORA'). It is important to acknowledge at the outset 
that the BORA is only one lens through which to analyse the education framework. 
Other approaches, such as an indigenous rights or Treaty of Waitangi analysis, would 
offer useful perspectives additional to those that this paper raises. Far from purporting 
to present the definitive word on religion in education, then, this paper presents one 
human 1ights analysis on which others can build . 
To set the scene, Pait II provides a b1ief history of religion 's place in New 
Zealand education. The law as it stands is outlined in Pait III, with Part IV drawing 
out some of the distinctions on which it is based. In preparation for the BORA 
analysis, Pait V seeks clarity on whose 1ights are at issue. Whether the BORA applies 
to actors within New Zealand's education framework is investigated in Part VI. Pait 
VII outlines the scope of the relevant rights and identifies a number of prima facie 
breaches. In Pait VIII, the wording of relevant legislative provisions is examined in 
order to determine whether the prima facie breaches ai·e saved in accordance with 
section 4. Having dete1mined that they ai·e, Pait IX considers whether it is 
nevertheless open to the comts to issue declarations of inconsistency - an enquiry 
that involves establishing whether the prima facie breaches are demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society. In accordance with these findings, Pait X details 
suggested legislative refo1ms. By making only relatively minor changes, every child's 
access to culturally appropriate education could be better ensured. 
II HISTORICAL BA CK GROUND 
The prov1s1on of (Pakeha) education in post-colonial New Zealand was 
initially a p1ivate affair perfo,med lai·gely by churches. With the establishment of the 
provinces in 1852, however, the responsibility for education was transfeITed to 
5 
provincial governments. 5 The responses of these governments to existing schools 
vmied. Whereas some provinces provided church schools with public funds, others 
directed their resources solely towards newly established public schools. 6 Among 
these schools, too, inconsistency reigned, with religious instruction sometimes 
emphasised, sometimes limited to Bible reading without comment, and sometimes 
forbidden altogether. 7 
By the time the soon-to-be Education Act reached Parliament in 1877, the 
priority was to establish a unified system. Consequently, religious matters became the 
subject of considerable compromise. As the then-Minister of Education ('the 
Minister') observed when introducing the Bill, the multi-denominational nature of 
Parliament rendered it incapable of settling upon "some general nondescript fo1111 of 
religion" to be taught in schools.8 While only a minority of Parliamentarians were 
secularists, the two opposing camps of Catholics (who suppo1ted state aid for 
Catholic schools but opposed religious instruction in public schools) and Protestants 
(who wanted religious instmction in public schools but opposed state aid for Catholic 
schools) effectively cancelled each other out.9 "[T]he only way to be absolutely fair", 
it seemed, was "to forbid teachers to give their pupils any religious instruction 
whatever." 10 Thus, the 1877 Act made no provision of aid for church schools, and 
required teaching to be "entirely of a secular character". 11 
5 
Paul Rishworih "Religious Issues in State Schools" in John Hannan, Paul Rishworth, Patrick Walsh 
Ed11cation Law (New Zealand Law Society, May-June 2006) 87, 91. 
6 
Colin McGeorge and Ivan Snook, "Church and State in New Zealand Education" in Colin McGeorge, 
Ivan Snook Church, State and New Zealand Ed11cation (Price Milburn, Wellington, 1981) 7, 7. 
7 McGeorge, Snook, above n 6, 8. 
8 Hon Charles C Bowen (24 July 1877) XXIV NZPD 36 . 
9 
RP Davis Irish lss11 es in New Zealand Politics 1868-1922 (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 
1974) 79. 
'
0 Bowen, above n 8 , 36. 
11 Education Act 1877, section 84(2). 
6 
Despite its strict wording, the 1877 Act did not operate to expel God from 
schools. Indeed, in introducing the Bill, the Minister was eager to clarify that such an 
expulsion was far from his mind: 12 
. . . while it is the duty of the State to take care that all children within its borders are 
educated, and to take charge of the secular education of the people, it is bound so to 
use its power that it may in no way tend to blunt or deaden that intuitive reverence 
for a higher power, that indestructible hope of immortality, which distinguishes us 
from the beasts that perish. 
A number of public schools, it seems, were inspired by the Minister's passion. Not 
only did they refrain from blunting their students' religious faith, they discovered a 
legal loophole through which they could actively foster it. The 'secular clause', they 
noted , was located in the same section of the Act as that which specified school 
hours, requiring schools to be open five days a week "for at least four hours, two of 
which in the forenoon and two in the afternoon shall be consecutive". 13 The short-fall 
between the two consecutive hours of secular education, as required by the Act, and 
the three hours for which most public schools were open each morning, allowed them 
to devote either the first or the last hour of each morning to religious instruction while 
still operating (nominally) within the letter of the law. 14 
This scheme, which came to be known as the 'Nelson system' because of its 
successful introduction in that region in 1897, gradually spread throughout the 
countiy. 15 By 1960, it was operating in eighty percent of public schools. 16 However, 
the Nelson system's legality was never asce11ained, and in 1962 the Cun-ie Report 
recommended legislative refo1m pennitting religious instruction and observances in 
ce1tain prescribed situations. 17 Parliament adopted the repo1t's findings, passing the 
Religious Instruction and Obse1vances in Public Schools Act 1962 ('the 1962 Act') 
12 Bowen, above n 8 , 36. 
13 Education Act 1877, section 84(2). 
14 Rishworth, above n 5, 91 . And see ILM Richardson Religion and th e Law (Wellington, Sweet & 
Maxwell , 1962) 22. 
15 McGeorge and Snook, above n 6, 15-16. 
16 McGeorge and Snook, above n 6, I 6. 
17 Rishworth, above n 14 , 91-92 . 
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with "remarkably little fuss". 18 This Act allowed religious instruction to be held 
during school hours, but not as patt of the official cmTiculum. Its provisions were 
soon incorporated into the Education Act 1964, the relevant sections of which are 
outlined below. 19 
Just as the secular character that the 1877 Act required of public schools was 
compromised, so too was the decision not to provide state aid for church schools 
ove1tumed. From the 1940s, gradual concessions were made on the provision of milk, 
textbooks, transport, heating and fumiture.20 By 1969, the financial plight of Catholic 
schools was such as to foster a degree of political consensus around the issue, with 
both Labour and National pledging aid to private schools. 21 Simultaneously, the 
notion of 'integrating' private schools into the public school system gained 
ascendance. A working pa1ty on the issue was fonned, and the Private Schools 
Conditional Integration Act (outlined below)22 was passed with little criticism from 
either the public or from professional organisations in 1975.23 
That "[t]he case for [secular] public schooling was lost" without a fight is a 
matter of great annoyance for pro-secular groups such as the Society for the 
Protection of Public Education.24 The passing of the 1962 and 1975 Acts can be 
attributed in pa1t to a rapprochement between Protestant and Catholic groups, to the 
extent that a unified voice sometimes emerged.25 With regard to the 1975 Act, pro-
secular groups have also pointed to the "secrecy" sun-ounding the integration 
18 McGeorge and Snook, above n 6, 18 . 
19 See Pari III A State Primary Schools. 
20 Ivan Snook "The Integration Act and its Afte1math" in Colin McGeorge, Ivan Snook Church, State, 
and New Zealand Education (Price Milburn, Wellington , 1981) 45, 45-46. 
21 Snook, above n 20, 46; John Hannan "Integrated Schools" in John Hannan , Patrick Walsh and Paul 
Rishworih Education Law - continuing challenges (New Zealand Law Society, May 2004) 131. 
22 See Pari III B Integrated Primary Schools. 
23 Snook, above n 20, 47; and see Hon PA Amos (23 July 1975) 400 3326. 
24 Jack Mulheron State Aid, Integration and New Zealand's Public Schools (Paerangi Books, 
Wellington , 1987) 4. 
25 Snook, above n 23, 45. 
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negotiations, suggesting that the education profession's si Jenee was "not that of 
approval but of ignorance". 26 Any bitterness was fuelled by the 1975 Act's 
supposedly "consequential amendment" to the 1964 Act, allowing the Minister to 
autho1ise religious instruction in state schools beyond that held under the elson 
system.27 Of complete in-elevance to integration, this amendment has been argued by 
some c1itics to fo1m pait of the trade-off whereby Protestant groups desisted from 
opposing state aid for Catholic schools. 28 After almost one hundred years of 
supposedly secular education, God was enjoying an increased presence in New 
Zealand classrooms. 
III THELAWASITSTANDS 
As the histo1ical overview indicates, the extent to which the law allows 
religion to play a part in children's education varies markedly between different types 
of schools. Whereas education is compulsory for all children between six and 16, 29 
there are no legislative requirements about what type of school children attend: public 
or private schools are equally satisfactory. 3° Further, parents can request the Minister 
to exempt their children from such requirements in order for them to be home-
schooled - 31 an area that is beyond this paper's scope. This section outlines the 
relevant legislation and (New Zealand) case law relating to religious activities in state 
p1imary schools, integrated p1imaiy schools, private prima1y schools, and secondaiy 
schools. 
26 Snook, above n 20, 48. 
27 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975 , section 83(8); Education Act 1964, section 78A; 
see Pa11 Il1 A State Primary Schools . 
28 Mulheron, above n 24, 17 . 
29 Education Act 1989 , section 20. 
30 This situation is the effect of section 20 and section 35A of the 1989 Act. See Paul Rish worth 
"Biculturalism, Multiculturalism, the Bill of Rights and the School Curriculum" in Legal Research 
Fow1dation Education and th e Law in New Zealand (University of Auckland, Auckland, 20 April 
1993) 14 . 
31 Education Act 1989 , section 21(1 ). 
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A State Primary Schools 
The religious instruction prov1s1ons relating to state pnmary schools are 
located in the 1964 Act. Section 77 requires that teaching at such schools "shall be 
entirely of a secular character". This requirement is limited , however, by sections 78 
and 78A. Section 78 legalises the Nelson system, providing that school boards of 
trustees, after consulting with their p1incipal, can decide to close their schools for up 
to 60 minutes a week (not exceeding 20 hours a year) for the purposes of religious 
instruction and observance. Section 78A extends beyond the Nelson system, allowing 
the Minister to approve additional religious activity in specific schools if he or she is 
satisfied that it has the support of the majority of parents and that it will not be 
detrimental to the nonnal cu1Ticulum of the school. Such additional religious 
activities can be "up to such an amount and subject to such conditions" as the 
Minister thinks fit. 32 
Section 79(1) allows parents to withdraw their children from religious 
instruction and observances by infonning the school's principal of their wishes in 
w1iting. This scheme applies to religious activities held under either section 78 or 
section 78A. With regard to those held under section 78, the process is nonsensical. 
In light of the fact that schools are officially closed dming such activities, it seems 
that children's attendance ought to be less a matter of 'opting out' than 'opting in'. A 
similar opt out scheme is also available for activities that do not amount to religious 
instruction or observance but that parents do not wish their children to attend on 
religious or cultural grounds. Provided by section 25A of the Education Act 1989 
("the 1989 Act"), this exemption can be requested with regard to any aspect of the 
cmTiculum. 
32 Education Act 1964, section 78A. 
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B Integrated Primary Schools 
Integrated schools are schools set up to provide "education with a special 
character" that have either integrated into the public system or been established under 
the 1975 Act.33 While integrated schools are thus part of the state system, for clarity 
of definition this paper refers to state schools as excluding integrated schools. All 
integrated schools must have an "integration agreement" with the Minister that 
records the te1ms and conditions of integration. 34 While nearly all expenses 
(including teacher salaries, maintenance, ea.retaking and heating) are met by the 
state, 35 integrated schools must provide their grounds and buildings. 36 In order to 
meet these costs, they can charge "attendance dues" if their integration agreements so 
"d 37 prov1 e. 
As provided by section 3(2), integration shall not jeopardise the special 
character of an integrated school. Thus, while integrated schools must comply with 
the provisions governing all state schools,38 and while they must teach the national 
cuiTiculum,39 these requirements are subject to the express provisions of the 1975 
Act.40 Most significantly, this means that the general school programme of integrated 
schools may reflect their special character. 41 With regard to schools for which 
religion fonns pai1 of that special character, religious examples may be used to 
reinforce teaching throughout the school day. 42 Fu11her, religious instruction and 
33 Private Schools Conditio nal Integra tion Act 1975 , section 3(1 ) . 
34 Private Schools Conditiona l Integra tion Act I 975, section 7(5). 
35 Private Schoo ls Condi tiona I Integra tion Act 197 5, section 4( I); Education Act 1989, section 3 . 
36 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, section 40(2). 
37 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975 , section 36(1 ). 
38 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975 , section 4(1 )(b). 
39 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, section 31. 
40 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, section 80(1 )(a). 
41 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975 , sections 3( 1 ), 3 1. 
42 Private Schools Conditional integration Act 1975, section 3 1. 
I I 
observance may be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions presc1ibed 
· · · 43 m integration agreements. 
The extent to which the 1975 Act allows integrated schools to require 
attendance at religious activities is the subject of some inconsistency. Section 30 
provides that, by enrolling a pupil at an integrated school, parents "shall accept as a 
condition of enrolment that the pupil is to participate in the general school 
progran1me that gives the school its special character". On reading this provision, it 
seems that integrated schools may make participation in religious activities 
compuls01y. Yet this suggestion is dispelled by section 32(2), which provides that 
integrated schools must be sensitive to the needs of "pupils and parents of different 
religions or philosophical affiliations", and shall not require pupils to pat1icipate in 
religious activities if exempted by their parents. As in state primary schools, then, 
parents may opt their children out of religious activities in integrated schools. It is 
unlikely, however, that it would be possible for students to attend an integrated 
school of a religious character without coming into contact with the particular 
religion that it reflects , as the opt out provision does not extend to standard classes in 
which religious exainples are used to reinforce the national cmTiculum.44 Section 25A 
of the 1989 Act, which allows students to be opted out of any class on the basis of 
religious or cultural reasons, does not apply to integrated schools.45 
C Private Primary Schools 
The provisions relating to religious instrnction and observance in the 1964 
Act do not apply to schools other than state primary schools.46 While 'private' (or 
'independent') schools must be registered or provisionally registered, 47 this 
43 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, section 32(1 ). 
44 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975 , section 31. 
45 Education Act 1989, section 25A(l B). 
46 Education Act 1964, section 81. 
47 Education Act 1989, section 35A. 
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requirement does not render them pai1 of the state education system. Further, such 
schools are not required to operate under the National Curriculum Guidelines.48 In 
order to be registered, however, private schools must have a "suitable ... curriculum" 
- a requirement that academics have interpreted to amount to a curriculum that is "not 
too different" to that of state schools. 49 In practice, this requirement limits the 
amount of religious activities that can be held in private schools. 
D Secondary Schools 
Like private primary schools, secondary schools are not required to comply 
with the 1964 Act's scheme pertaining to religious observance and instruction. 50 
Indeed, no legislative provisions limit secondary schools' freedom with regard to 
religious activities. Just like state p1imai·y schools, however, students may be 
exempted from particular classes on religious or cultural grounds. 51 
The matter of whether limits should be imposed on religious activities m 
secondaiy schools was considered by the Court of Appeal in Rich v Christchurch 
Girls' High School Board of Governors. 52 In that case, two students were expelled 
after organising a protest in which 30 students walked out of assembly in reaction to 
its indocttinating religious content. 53 School policy allowed students to be excused 
from the religious part of the assembly if they obtained a letter from their parents to 
that effect - a step which neither of the two students had taken. Counsel for the 
students ai·gued that the school board was not entitled to make attendance at the 
48 Rishworth "Biculturalism, Multiculturalism, the Bill of Rights and the School Cu1Ticulum", above n 
30, 19. 
49 Rishwm1h "Biculturalism, Multiculturalism, the Bill ofRights and the School Curriculum", above n 
30 , 19. 
50 Education Act 1964, section 81. 
51 Education Act 1989, section 25A. 
52 Rich v Christchurch Girls ' High School Board of Governors (No 1) [ 1974 J I NZLR I; Rich v 
Christchurch Girls' High School Board of Governors (No 2) [ 1974] 1 NZLR 21. 
53 The assembly included hymns, a Bible reading, a sho11 prayer, and the singing of the Lord 's Prayer. 
See Rich v Christchurch Girls' High School Board of Governors (No 1), above n 52, 3. 
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religious pa1t of the assembly compulsory (bar a letter from students' parents). 54 This 
argument did not find favour with the Cou11. While White J found it unnecessaiy to 
dete1mine the point,55 McCa1thy J held that secondaiy school boai·ds have the power 
to hold religious observances providing that there is a procedure whereby students 
can be exempted.56 It is impo1tant to note that the decision was delivered before the 
introduction of the BORA. 
IV EDUCATION VERSUS INDOCTRINATION: AN IMPORTANT 
DISTINCTION? 
Having outlined the relevant law, it is useful to identify the concepts on which 
it is based. 1n referring to such phrases as "religious instruction and observances" and 
"secular character", the legislative provisions implicitly rely on a distinction between 
religion and secularism. Yet what is the basis of this bina1y? Is all content that refers 
to religion necessarily precluded from being seculai·? 
1n its advice to schools, the Minist1y has adopted the traditional liberal stance 
on this issue. The concept of secula1ism, it argues, should be sufficiently broad to 
include "a natural, unemba1rnssed reference to religion and religious history ... in 
appropriate paits of the [cuITiculum]". 57 ln other words, education is "secular" if it 
does not promote one paiticular religion but rather info1ms children about different 
cultures and values. By contrast, activities amount to "religious instrnction and 
observances" if they are of an indoct1inating nature, not only infonning students 
about religious values but also actively encouraging worship in accordance with 
them. Whereas education about religion is secular, instruction in religion is not. 
54 Rich v Christchurch Girls' High School Board of Governors (No I), above n 52, 6. 
55 Rich v Christchurch Girls' High School Board of Governors (No 1 ) , above n 52, 16. 
56 Rich v Christchurch Girls' High School Board o.f Governors (No 1 ), above n 52, 6. 
57 Depattment of Education Circular "Religiou In [ruction and Observances in State Primary Schools" 
( 13 February 1987) E30/2/13 (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Ministry 
of Education); Nonnan La Rocque, Senior Manager Education Management Policy to the Minister of 
Education "Religious Instruction in State Schools" (31 March 1999) Letter (Obtained under Official 
Information Act 1982 Request to the Ministry of Education). 
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Because the distinction is well established in ew Zealand , this paper will 
adopt its tenninology in the interest of clarity. Despite the Ministry's long-standing 
reliance on the distinction, however, it is by no means clear-cut. Several 
complications with the "purpo11ed dichotomy" are examined below. 58 By way of 
foreshadowing this discussion , suffice it to say that the distinction serves to equate 
the concepts of seculmism and neutrality in a manner that does not withstand 
scmtiny. 
V WHOSE RIGHTS ARE AT STAKE? 
The purpose of this paper is to assess religion 's place in education in light of 
the BORA. Before embarking upon this analysis, however, it is necessary to clarify 
just whose rights are at stake. At present, the power to decide the religious activities 
in which children partake is generally granted to parents. In state primary schools ,59 
integrated schools60 and even secondary schools,6 1 statements oflaw purpo11 to allow 
students ' exemption only at their parents ' instruction.62 Yet is it coJTect to conceive of 
religion in education p1imarily as a 'parental rights ' issue? Should not children 's 
rights also have a role to play? When children want to attend religious instruction 
classes, for instance, but their parents wish to prevent thi s attendance, whose opinion 
should prevail? 
The Care of Children Act 2004 (' the CCA') requires that the " first and 
paramount consideration" in decisions relating to children is the "welfare and best 
58 Nomi Maya Sto lzenberg "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me O ut: Ass imil ation, lndoc trina ti on and the 
Paradox o f a Liberal Education" ( 1993) 106 Harv L Rev 5 8 1, 6 1 1 . 
59 Education Act 1964 , section 79. 
60 Private Schoo ls Conditional Integration Act 1975, section 32(2). 
61 Rich v Christchurch Girls ' High School Board of Governors (No 1), above n 52. 
62 The one exception regards the opting out of standard classes in state schoo ls on religious or cultural 
grounds, when students aged 16 o r above are empowered to seek exemption on their own beha lf. See 
Educa tion Act 1989 , section 25A. 
15 
interests of the child".63 While this staiting point is beyond reproach , it does not get 
one ve1y far in considering religion in schools, for it does nothing to clai·ify who, 
within the fainily, gets to decide what the child's welfare and best interests constitute. 
In order to resolve this issue, it is necessary to consider ew Zealand's care of 
children framework in light of international obligations64 and ju1isprudence. 
In New Zealand, 'guai·dianship' is the core legal notion relating to the raising 
of children. When the education provisions refer to the role of pai·ents, they are 
presumably intended to refer to guardians. As specified in the CCA, guardianship 
includes "deciding for, or with the child" all matters relating to education.65 That this 
role amounts to a strong '1ight' is suppo1ted by aiticle 13(3) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 66 and a1ticle 26(3) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights , the latter of which provides that "parents 
have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children".67 
Yet just as there are international provisions emphasising the impo1tance of 
parents ' wishes regai·ding their children's religious education, so too does 
international law recognise children's right to influence such decisions . Unlike earlier 
international declarations, which were concerned solely with children's 'cai·e and 
63 Care of Children Act 2004, section 4. 
64 In Tavita v Minister of Immigration [I 994] 2 NZLR 257 , 265-266 (CA) Cooke P for the Court, it 
was stated that any argument purpo1ting to allow the executi ve to ignore international in struments is 
"unattractive". 
65 Care of Children Act 2004, sections 16( 1 )(c), I 6(2). 
66 International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (3 January 1976) 993 
UNTS 3, a11 I 3(3) requires states to: 
... unde11ake to have respect for the liberty of parents, and , when ap plicable, lega l guardians, to choose 
for their eh ildren, schoo ls, other than those establi shed by the public authorities, which conform to 
such minimum ed ucational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and that ensure the 
religious and moral ed ucation of their children in confonnity with their own convictions. 
67 UNGA Uni versal Declaration of l-Iuman Rights Reso lution 217 A (111) ( I O December 1948) a11 
26(3 ). 
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protection' rights,68 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ('the 
UNCROC') incorporates the notion of autonomy-based "individual personality 
rights" for children.69 In paiticular, article 14 guarantees a child's right to "freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion". 70 As the UNCROC specifies, with this rise in 
children's 1ights comes a decrease in the rights of parents and guardians. While 
aiticle 5 protects pai·ental 1ights to some extent, these rights are limited to "a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child". 71 Specifically with regard to 
religious upbringing, aiticle 14 respects parents' rights to raise their child m 
accordance with their religion, but agam only "in a manner consistent with the 
evolving capacities of the child".72 
This 'evolving capacities' approach towai·ds children's rights is reflected in 
the international jurisprudence. In the landmark case of Gillick v West No1folk and 
Wisbech AHA, the House of Lords held that parental rights de1ive from parental duty, 
and exist only so long as they are needed for the protection of the person and property 
of the child. 73 As soon as the child has attained "a sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed" in a particular 
situation - the test of so-called 'Gillick-competence' - then any parental tights with 
regard to that situation cease. Even if both guardians and the comts consider the 
Gillick-competent child's decision to be contrary to his or her best interests, the 
child's decision must still be upheld. The Supreme Cou1t of Canada has applied this 
principle to religious activities in DP v CS. 74 While Gillick is not referred to, the 
Cou1t found that, "subject to ... the child's best interests, custodial rights include the 
68 These declarations include the League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child ( 1924) and 
the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1959). See Bruce Hafen 
and Jonathon Hafen "Abandoning Children to their Autonomy: the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child" (1996) 37 Harv lnt ' I LI 449, 459. 
69 Hafen , above n 68,459. 
70 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989) 1577 UNTS 3, a11 14( 1 ). 
71 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 70, art 5. 
71 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 70, a11 14(2). 
73 Gillick v West No,fo/k and Wisbech AHA [1985] AC 112, 188- 189 (IIL) Lord Scarman . 
14 DP v CS [ 1 993] 4 SCR 141. 
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1ight to decide upon the child's religious education, until he or she is in a position to 
make his or her own choice".75 
It is unce1tain whether Gillick applies in New Zealand. As one commentator 
has noted, any attempt to implement the approach is "noticeably absent" in the CCA, 
which retains arbitrary age cut-off rules. 76 The cowts, too, are yet to adopt Gillick, 
although it is open for them to do so in the future. Indeed, it could be argued that such 
an approach is required. ot only is it suppo1ted by New Zealand's ratification of the 
UNCROC (and hence the 'evolving capacities' approach therein), but it is more 
consistent with the BORA provisions on age discrimination 77 and freedom of 
expression.78 A more comprehensive analysis of Gillick's status in New Zealand 1s 
not within the scope of this paper. 
Although complicated, it would be possible to apply Gillick to children's 
enrolment in schools - and, within schools, to their pa1ticipation in religious 
activities. The issue could be addressed in initial meetings between children, their 
guardians, and p1incipals before a child is admitted to a school. There, principals 
could take on the role perfonned by doctors in England in detennining whether 
children are Gillick-competent. When verdicts of competence are reached, p1incipals 
would follow the wishes of the child, whereas findings of incompetence would direct 
them to seek the wishes of children's guardians. While this scheme may be 
particularly problematic in integrated and private schools, where principals may be 
loath to forego attendance dues by refusing to enrol iITeligious, Gillick-competent 
children, it can surely be trusted that principals will can-y out the assessment in good 
faith. 
75 DP,, CS, above n 74, 162 L' Heureux-Dube (my emphasis). 
76 Bill Atkin "The Care of Children Bill Alright But Only So Far As It Goes" (Developing 
Child/Youth Law and Policy, November 2003) <www.conferenz.co.nz> (last accessed 28 September 
2006). 
77 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section 14; Atkin, above n 76. 
78 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section 19; Human Rights Act 1993 , section 2l(l)(i). 
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Such a process would provide an appropriate solution to conflicts between the 
opinions of children and their guardians. If Gillick applies, it places a limit on 
guardians' legal power to exempt children from religious activities and detennine 
which schools they attend. In effect, Gillick would require that, once a child is 
Gillick-competent, guardians must exercise their power in a manner that accords with 
the views of the child. As such, guardians would essentially constitute the agents of 
GiL!ick-competent children for the purposes of decisions per1aining to religion in 
schools. If Gillick does not apply, however, then the full power of decision remains 
with guardians. The matter of whose rights are at stake is thus highly contestable. 
Consequently, this paper will refer to the rights of 'children and guardians' when 
considering BORA issues . It is to this analysis that the paper now turns. 
VI DOES THE BORA APPLY? 
As provided by section 3 of the BORA, in order for the BORA to apply, the 
relevant act must be perfonned either:79 
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function , power, or 
duty confen-ed or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
With regard to religion in schools, there are several relevant actors. First, there 
is the state, which has legislated to allow both for particular content in schools (such 
as religious activities and other material that is incompatible with ce11ain religious 
beliefs) and for the existence of integrated schools. Of course, there is no substantive 
section 3 issue here: that the BORA applies to the legislative branch of government is 
stated in section 3(a). 
Second, there are the schools in which the religious (and iITeligious) content is 
taught. For the purposes of the BORA analysis, a school's actions are to be attributed 
79 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ection 3. 
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to its governing body. In state primary schools, integrated schools and secondary 
schools, this body is refeITed to as the board of trustees. As provided by section 75 of 
the 1989 Act, a school's board has "complete discretion to control the management of 
the school as it thinks fit" (except to the extent that legislation provides otherwise). 80 
Thus, all decisions that schools have jurisdiction to make are to be attributed to 
school boards. While private schools are not required by statute to have boards, 81 this 
paper will assume for convenience that their governing bodies are also referred to as 
boards. Having identified the relevant actors, it falls to be dete1mined whether the 
BORA applies to them. This Part considers sections 3(a) and 3(b) in tum. 
A Section 3(a) 
That school boards are not pa11 of the legislative or judicial branches of 
government is clear. The question of whether they are part of 'the executive', 
however, is more contentious. To date, New Zealand courts have tended to give the 
phrase a relatively nmTow meaning, detennining a body to be within its mnbit only if 
it is pm1 of the government's depm1mental structure.82 As all school boards are self-
governing, they are not pai1 of the Ministly. According to this approach, then, school 
bom·ds are not pai1 of New Zealand's executive branch of government. 
An alternative approach was taken in M v Board of Trustees of Palmerston 
North Boys High Schoo/.83 There, the issue was whether the board's decision to expel 
a pupil from the boarding school (allowing him to remain as a day pupil) was subject 
to the BORA. In her judgment, Goddard J extended the definition of 'the executive' 
from acts perfonned directly by that branch of government to, "arguably, ... the acts 
of an agent" of that branch of government "where there is evidence of a close and 
80 Education Act 1989, section 75. 
81 Section 75 of the Education Act 1989 does not apply to private chool , 
82 Federated Farm ers v New Zealand Post [l 990-92] 3 NZBORR 339 (HC). See Andrew Butler and 
Petra Butler Th e New Zealand Bill o.f Rights: A Comm entwy (Lex is Nex is NZ, Wellington , 2005) 92. 
83 M ,, Board o_f Trustees of Palmerston North Boys High School [ 1997] 2 NZLR 60 (HC). 
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direct relationship of agency".84 Yet instead of holding that boards, as self-governing 
entities, act as the 'agent' of the Ministry, Goddard J found that the statutory powers 
of school boards do not bring them into a "sufficiently close and direct agency 
relationship with the government". 85 Even under a broad interpretation of 'the 
executive', then, school boards are not caught by section 3(a). 
B Section 3(b) 
If boards' decision to allow religious activities and other material that is 
incompatible with ce11ain religious beliefs is subject to the BORA, it must fit the 
requirements of section 3(b). That is, in making the relevant decision , boards must be 
exercising a "public function , power or duty confeITed or imposed on [them] by or 
pursuant to law". 86 
As yet there is scant case law applying section 3 (b) to the education sector. In 
Rose v Te Wananga o Aotearoa, the parties agreed that the defendant university was 
bound by the BORA. Hence, the matter was not the subject of substantive analysis, 
with Gendall AJ merely stating that "the defendant is a body which perfonns a public 
function, namely education, and its 1ight to do so is confe,,-ed by law namely, the 
Education Act 1989".87 In Palmerston North Boys, however, the issue was considered 
in more detail. While it was implicit that the board was sometimes perfo1ming a 
public function, it was decided that the contract for boarding was a "p,ivate 
commercial a1i-angement", and hence did not involve the exercise of a public 
84 M v Board of Trustees of Palmerston North Boys High School, above n 83, 70 Goddard J (my 
emphasis). 
85 M v Board of Trustees of Palmerston North Boys High School, above n 83, 70 Goddard J. 
86 New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990, section 3(b). 
87 Rose v Te Wiinanga o Aotearoa (30 September 2004) High Cow1 Wellington CIV 2003-485-2481 
Gendal I AJ; and see Butler and Butler, above n 82, I 02. 
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function. 88 Emphasis was also placed on the fact that the board was not making a 
statutory power of decision when it removed the student from the boarding house.89 
1n light of the reasoning in Pa/merston North Boys, it seems that, contrary to 
the result in that case, school boards are perfonning a 'public function' under section 
3(b) when deciding to hold an impugned class or activity. 1n contrast to the situation 
at issue in Palmerston North Boys, which revolved around a private commercial 
agreement, students' pa11icipation in religious activities constitutes a component of 
their education - the ve1y public function that it is the role of schools to perfonn. 
Thus, it seems that the decision of all school boards to allow religious activities is 
subject to the BORA. 
With regard to state pnma1y schools' holding of religious instrnction and 
observances, there is the added complication that section 78 of the 1964 Act provides 
that they are closed dming such activities. 1n light of this fact, it could be argued that 
the board's decision to hold them does not constitute a 'public function' as the classes 
do not technically fonn part of the school day. This argument is not convincing: just 
because an activity takes place outside nomrnl class hours does not mean that it 
se1ves no educative purpose (and, thus, no public function). Yet even if it is coITect, 
state primaiy schools are still caught by section 3(b). Unlike the board in Palmerston 
North Boys , a state p1ima1y school board is making a 'statuto1y power of decision ' 
when closing the school for religious activities - namely, that provided for by section 
78 of the 1964 Act. Thus, a state primary school board's decision to hold religious 
instruction and observance is subject to the BORA. 
An issue also anses with regard to private schools. In Bishop of Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Port Louis v Tengur, the Privy Council held (respecting the 
Mauritius Constitution) that private schools do not perfonn a public function if they 
88 Palm erston North Boys High School, above 11 83 , 67 Goddard J. 
89 Palm erston North Boys High School, above 11 83. 68 Goddard J. 
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are "entirely self-financing".90 Under this test, the BORA would apply only to those 
private schools that receive grants from the government. Paul Rishworth , however, 
takes an even nanower approach, suggesting that the BORA does not apply to any 
private schools, regardless of whether or not they receive state grants. 91 Neither 
Rishworth nor the Privy Council provide substantive reasons as to why private 
schools are not exercising a public function. What is more, their reasoning is difficult 
to sunnise: contrary to their conclusions, the fact that (in New Zealand, at least) 
attendance of private schools satisfies the compulsory education requirement seems 
to indicate that they do perfonn the public function of providing education.92 Private 
school boards are effectively, as Randerson J expresses it in Ransfield v Radio 
Network Ltd, 'standing in the shoes of government' when they educate children.93 
This paper will proceed on the basis that the BORA also applies to p1ivate school 
boards. 
VII WHAT DO THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE BORA 
REQUIRE? 
Having detennined that the BORA applies to both the state and school boards, 
it falls to be considered whether they have breached the rights and freedoms that the 
BORA affiims. The process by which this analysis should be conducted is not set in 
stone. A comprehensive approach is suggested by Tipping J in Moonen v Film and 
Literature Board of Review, 94 although he was clear that it is not prescriptive. 95 
Neve1theless, as the leading approach to date, Tipping J's process is followed by this 
paper. 
90 Bishop of Roman Catholic Diocese of Port Louis v Tengur (2004) 16 BHRC 21, para 21 (PC) Lord 
Bingham ofCornhill. 
91 Rishworth "Biculturalism, Multiculturalism, the Bill ofRights and the School CwTiculum", above n 
30, 19. 
92 See Andrew S Butler "ls This A Public Law Case?" (2000) 31 VUWLR 747, 768-769. 
93 Rans.field v Radio Network Lid [2005] I NZLR 233,247 (HC) Randerson J. 
94 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (No 1) [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 (CA). 
95 Moonen "Film and Literature Board of Review (No 1 ), above n 94, 16; and see Moonen v Film and 
Literature Board of Revie,v (No 2) (2002] 2 NZLR 7 54, 760 (CA) Richardson P . 
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The preliminary step is to "dete1min[e] the scope of the relevant right or 
freedom", thereby identifying prima facie breaches. 96 This Pait will consider four 
matters that potentially give rise to breaches of religious freedom and anti-
disc1imination rights. Section A considers schools' holding of religious instrnction or 
observance. The implications of religious education and other 'secular' classes that 
are not designed to indoctrinate are explored in section B. Sections C and D each 
relate to the state's decision to paitially fund integrated schools; whereas Section C 
analyses the issue in light of the state's omission to provide full funding, Section D 
considers the ramifications of the decision to provide some funding. Far from co-
existing haimoniously, the various p1ima facie breaches that these matters identify 
reflect the many competing ai1d conflicting 1ights that are at stake. Accordingly, 
Section E considers how this tension is to be addressed. 
A Does the Holding of Religious Observance or Instruction Constitute a 
Prima Facie Breach? 
1 Section 13: Freedom of religion 
Section 13 provides that "[ e ]ve1yone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion, and belief, including the right to hold opinions without 
interference". As yet, the section has been the subject of only ve1y limited case law. 97 
As the wording of the section itself makes clear, however, its ambit extends not only 
to the freedom to adopt such religious and philosophical beliefs as a person chooses, 
but also to the 1ight to hold those beliefs free of coercion or restraint - specifically, 
"without interference". 98 This latter 1ight is of pa1ticular relevance to religious 
96 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, above n 94, 16 . 
97 Mendelssohn ,, Attorney-General [ 1999] 2 NZLR 268 (CA) Keith J for the Cou1i. See Pa1i VII C 
Does the State's Omission to Fully Fund Integrated Schools ofa Religious Character Constitute a 
Prima Facie Breach? 
98 Butler and Butler, above n 82,407 . 
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observance and instrnction in schools, as such activities may have the potential to 
interfere with the religious and philosophical beliefs of students. 
International case law is of assistance in predicting what courts may hold the 
tight to hold one's beliefs "without interference" to mean. In R v Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd, the Supreme Comt of Canada held that "freedom" of religion is prima1ily 
characterised by an absence of "coercion" to change one's religious and ethical 
beliefs. 99 Such coercion includes "indirect forms of control which determine or limit 
courses of conduct available to others". 100 In other words, the Charter guarantees 
freedom both of andji-om religion. 101 
This Canadian jurisprndence is reinforced by European case law. Both 
Kokkinakis v Greece ' 02 and Larissis v Greece 103 involved applications to the 
European Comt of Human Rights ("the ECtHR") seeking declarations that 
convictions under Greece's anti-proselytism laws contravened the applicants' 
freedom of religion, as protected by article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 104 In Kokkinakis, the applicant was a man of the Jehovah's Witness religion 
who had been arrested more than 60 times for proselytism. While the ECtHR upheld 
the complaint, finding that the right of individuals to "bea[r] Ch1istian witness" is 
protected by a11icle 9, it was noted that "improper proselytism" is not protected. 105 
Such proselytism includes actions designed to inappropriately influence individuals 
99 R v Big Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 18 DLR (4th) 321,354 (SCC) Dickson J. 
100 R v Big Drug Mart Ltd, above n 99,321,353. 
101 Rex Ahdar, New Zealand and the Idea of a Christian State in Rex Ahdar and Stenhouse (eds) God 
and Government: the New Zealand Experience (University ofOtago Press, Dunedin, 2000) 72. 
102 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 El-IRR 397 (ECtHR). 
103 Larassis v Greece (1998) 27 El-IRR 329 (ECtHR). 
104 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 , art 9( 1) 
provides: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief and freedom , either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
105 Kokkinakis v Greece, above n 102,422. 
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h · 106 ak' to change their beliefs, whether this be throug improper pressure, t mg 
h 107 h · f advantage of individuals with a reduced capacity to c oose, or t e negation o 
individual choice implied by "brainwashing". 108 
In Larissis, the appellants were officers in the Greek Air Force who had been 
convicted of attempting to convert ce1tain subordinates and civilians to the 
Pentecostal Church. The majority of the ECtHR upheld the application in pa.it, 
finding that the convictions with regard to the civilians were unsound but that the 
convictions concerning the subordinate ainnen were justified. In so finding, the Cou,t 
emphasised the position of power held by the officers over their subordinates: 109 
.. . the hierarchical structures which are a feature of I ife in the anned forces may 
colour every aspect of the relations between military personnel , making it difficult 
for a subordinate to rebuff the approaches of an individual of supe1ior rank or to 
withdraw from a conversation initiated by him. 
While the Comt was cai·eful to acknowledge that "not eve,y discussion about religion 
or other sensitive matters between individuals of unequal rank" is actionable by the 
state, 110 it is impo1tant to note that Larissis upheld the right of the state, in ce,tain 
situations, to criminally sanction individuals who attempt to interfere with others ' 
beliefs. That the state itself might have a right to endorse such interference is cleai·ly 
far from the Cou,t's contemplation. 
Applying these tests to the holding of religious observance and instrnction in 
schools , they indicate that such activities constitute a prima facie breach of section 
13. If only the dominant religion (say, Ch1istianity) is reflected, then religious 
instrnction and observances impose Christian obse,vances upon non-Christian 
106 Kokkinakis v Greece, above n I 02, 422 Mr Loucaides. 
107 Kokkinakis v Greece, above n I 02 , 414 . 
108 Kokki11akis v Greece, above n I 02, 412. 
109 Larassi v Greece, above n I 03 , 362 Mr Ma11inez. 
11 0 Larassis v Greece, above n I 03 , 362 Mr Martinez. 
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pupils. 111 Moreover, like the relationship between the officers and airmen in Larissis, 
teachers are in a position of power over their students that makes it "difficult for 
[students] ... to withdraw from [classes] initiated by [teachers]". 112 lndeed, the age of 
school students (especially those at prima1y schools) can be argued to indicate that 
they have a reduced capacity to choose to the extent that they are pa11icularly 
vulnerable to "brainwashing". 113 
Religious instruction and observances, then, have the potential to breach 
section 13. It remains to be seen whether the provision for students to be opted out of 
activities negates any coercion at play. International jurisprudence is divided on the 
issue. Turning first to that maintaining that the opt out policy is sufficient to remedy 
the potential breach, the Human Rights Committee ('the HRC') has noted that: 114 
... public education that includes instruction in a pa11icular religion or belief is 
inconsistent with a11icle 18 .4 unless provision is made for non-discriminatory 
exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and 
guardians. 
This approach was applied by the HRC in Leirvag and others v Norway. 115 There, the 
applicants were contesting a new mandatory religious subject in the Norwegian 
school system entitled 'Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education' 
("CKREE"). Provision was made for parents to exempt their children from "attending 
those parts of the teaching at the individual school that they, on the basis of their own 
religion or philosophy of life, perceive as being the practice of another religion or 
adherence to another philosophy of life". 116 In finding that this paitial exemption 
policy breached the freedom of religion provisions of the ICCPR, the Committee 
emphasised that the unpredictable nature of the CKREE class meant that, in practice, 
111 See Zy!berbe1g v Sudbiuy Board of Education ( 1988) 65 OR (2d) 641, 652 (Ont CA) Brooke Blair, 
Goodman and Robins JJ; and see Butler and Butler, above n 82,425. 
112 Larassis v Greece, above n I 03, 362 Mr Ma11inez. 
113 Kokkinakis v Greece, above n l 02, 4 I 2. 
114 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 22 "The right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion" para 6, 
115 Leirvag and others v Nonvay (23 November 2004) CCPR/C/82/D/ 1155/2003. 
116 Leirvag and others v Nonvay, above n 115 , 3. 
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the partial exemption policy did not operate m a "neutral and objective way" (a 
concept that is explored below). It was implicit that, in accordance with General 
Comment 22, provision for the full exemption of children from the CKREE class 
would not contravene article 18.4 of the Convention. 
In Canada, however, the courts have taken a different approach. Zylberberg v 
Sudbu,y Board of Education involved regulation that allowed opening or closing 
religious exercises in state schools, 11 7 with an opt out provision much like that in 
New Zealand. 118 In striking down the regulation, the majority found that the opt out 
provision did not overcome the infringement of the Charter: 119 
On the contrary, the exemption provision imposes a penalty on pupils from religious 
mino1ities who utilize it by stigmatizing them as non-confom,ists and setting them 
apa11 from their fellow students who are members of the dominant religion. 
In reaching this conclusion, much emphasis was placed on the "acute sensitiv[ity ]" of 
children to peer pressure and class-room norms, which were found to "compel 
members of religious mino1ities to confo1m with majo,ity religious practices". 120 
Despite the allowance for students to be opted out of religious instruction and 
observances, the peer pressure of other children, the incentives (Easter eggs, the joys 
of 'colou1ing in'), and the lack of engaging alternatives (cleaning the PE shed) mean 
that the holding of such activities constitutes an indirect fonn of control under which 
students have limited courses of conduct available to them other than to attend. 
In light of these conflicting approaches, New Zealand cou1ts would have to 
elect which to follow. At face value, both authorities are persuasive: the BORA was 
enacted to affinn New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR, 121 so HRC 
11 7 Zylb erbe1g v S11dbu1 y Board of Edu cation, above n 111 , 644. 
11 8 Education Act 1964, section 79. 
11 9 Zylberbe,g v Sudbwy Board of Edu cation , above n 111 , 656. 
120 Zylb erbe1g v S11dbw y Board of Edu cation, above n 111 , 655. 
121 The long title of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that it is an Act: 
(a) To affirm , protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand; and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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jmisprndence must be given due weight; but the Canadian Chai1er provided the direct 
model for the BORA, 122 so Canadian case law is also of great value. Ultimately, it 
seems that the Ontario Court of Appeal's reasoning is the more robust of the two 
approaches. By addressing the reality of the primary school classroom, the judgment 
draws attention to the actual impact that the very holding of religious activities can 
have on children, even if they are exempted from them. This approach is supported 
by the New Zealand Com1 of Appeal's emphasis of the need to take a "broad and 
purposive" approach to defining rights. 123 Thus, despite the opt out provisions, the 
holding ofreligious activities breaches section 13. 
2 Section 19: Freedom from discrimination 
Also at issue is whether boards' decision to hold religious instruction and 
observances discriminate against students whose beliefs do not accord with the 
pai1icular religion to which the activities adhere. Section 19(1) of the BORA provides 
that "everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993" ('the HRA'). These grounds include 
religious and ethical beliefs, the latter of which is defined as "the lack of a religious 
belief, whether in respect of a particulai· religion or religions or all religions". 124 
While section 19 has been at issue in several cases before the courts, many 
unresolved issues remain. 
The first substantive issue relates to the very meanmg of 'disc1imination' 
itself. Under one approach (the 'broad approach'), prima facie disc1imination is 
understood to have occuJTed when three requirements are met. First, the impugned act 
must make a distinction between two comparable groups. 125 Second, this distinction 
must be made on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. Third, the 
122 Butler and Butler, above n 82, 81. 
123 Ministry of Transport v Noori [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 269 (CA) Cooke P. 
124 New Zealand Human Rights Act, section 21 (I )(c), (d). 
125 Butler and Butler, above n 82, 500. 
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distinction must involve disadvantage to the disfavoured group. 126 Whether a prima 
facie breach is justified is a separate question to be dealt with under section 5. 127 By 
contrast, an alternative approach (the 'natTow approach') incorporates the issue of 
whether different treatment is justified within the section 19 analysis. That is, in order 
for the relevant act or omission to constitute ptima facie discrimination, it must 
involve "invidious treatment". 128 Under the nan-ow approach there is little or no room 
for a section 5 analysis, as invidious distinctions at·e inevitably unjustified in a free 
d d · · 129 an emocrattc society. 
New Zealand case law is oflittle help in deciding which approach to apply. In 
the leading Court of Appeal authority of Quilter v Attorney-General, three of the five 
judges (including both majo1ity and dissenting judges) adopted the nan-ow approach, 
and one judge applied the broad approach. 130 As academics agree, however, Quilter is 
"quite unsatisfacto1y and unlikely to stand the test of time as to the methodology 
used" - 131 yet these same academics themselves diverge on the best way forward. 132 
In line with Ministry of Justice policy, 133 this paper adopts the broad approach to 
disc1imination. While both approaches at·e viable when considering discrete issues 
that do not involve conflicts ofrights, the multiple issues concerning education policy 
render the naITow approach inapplicable. It is nonsensical to consider justification at 
the prima facie stage when conducting a section 19 analysis , but later under section 5 
when applying section 13. Such an approach would effectively create a hierarchy of 
126 Butler and Butler, above n 82, 500. 
127 Quilter vAttorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 , 576 (CA) Tipping J. 
128 Huscroft, above n 131 , 376. 
129 Quilter v Allorney-General, above n 127 , 540 Thomas J. 
130 The na1rnw approach was taken by Gault J, Keith J and Thomas J dissenting. Tipping J ultimately 
favours the broad approach. Richardson P, in a very short concurringjudgment, did not state which 
approach he was taking. 
131 Butler and Butler, above n 82,490; ee also Grant Huscroft "Freedom from Discrimination" in Paul 
Rishwo11h, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Ox ford, 2003) 366,376 - 377. 
132 Butler and Butler, above n 82, 500; but see 1-Iuscroft, above n 131, 375-376. 
133 See, for instance, Min is try of Justice "Applying the B ii I of Rights Act Non-Discrimination 
Standard" (March 2002) <www .justice.govt.nz> (last accessed 27 September 2006). 
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tights, as the justificatoty issues regarding section 19 would 'get in first' before those 
regarding section 13. 
Applying the broad approach 's first step (namely, whether there is a 
distinction between two comparable groups) to religious activities in schools, a 
further issue regarding discrimination's meaning atises. In holding such activities, 
school boards are not making a fotmal distinction between students on the ground of 
their religious or ethical belief. The problem is not that schools are treating students' 
religious beliefs as a basis upon which to differentiate between them; rather, it is that 
they are failing to take students' different beliefs into account when holding 
instrnction or observances in accordance with only one religion. In other words, while 
boards' decision to hold religious activities does not make a direct distinction 
between students on the basis of their religious or ethical beliefs , it does make an 
indirect distinction ; the effect of the decision is to make a distinction between those 
students who receive instrnction in accordance with their religious beliefs and those 
who do not. 
New Zealand case law is unclear as to whether indirect distinctions are 
prohibited by section 19. In Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights 
Commission (a judgment that has been declared the "one bright spot" in this 
countty's section 19 jurisprndence), 134 Cartwright J held that both direct and indirect 
discrimination are prosctibed by section 19. 135 This approach was not unanimously 
adopted in Quilter; whereas Thomas and Tipping JJ followed Ca11wright J, 136 Gault J 
applied a strictly formalistic approach 137 and Richardson P and Keith J failed to 
detennine the point. The resulting ambiguity does not afflict international 
jurisprudence. In Canada, for instance, Chai1er jurisprudence is settled that indirect 
134 Butler and Butler, above n 82, 499 . 
135 Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission [1998] 2 NZLR 218 , 236 (HC) 
Cartwright J. 
136 Quilter, above n 127, 531 , 574 . 
137 Quilter, above n 127, 527 . 
31 
distinctions suffice - 138 a position with which New Zealand academics agree.
139 In 
light of the general consensus, this paper assumes that indirect discrimination 
constitutes discrimination for the pu1pose of section 19. In accordance with the above 
analysis, it follows that the first requirement is met. 
The second step involves detennining whether the distinction is made on the 
basis of a prohibited ground. This requirement is also satisfied. As noted above, the 
effect of the religious activities is to make a distinction between students on the basis 
of their religious or ethical belief. Such beliefs constitute a prohibited ground of 
disc1imination, as enumerated by sections 21(l)(c) and (d) of the HRA. 
Finally, it must be considered whether the distinction involves disadvantage to 
the disfavoured group. 14° Canadian authority demonstrates that disadvantage can 
involve either imposing a burden or withholding a benefit. 141 Here, school boards' 
decision to hold religious instruction or observance does both. First, the fact that 
students outside the dominant religion do not have the oppo1tunity to be taught about 
their religious or ethical belief in school constitutes the withholding of a benefit: such 
students do not have the same oppo1tunity as members of the dominant faith to 
integrate into their culture. 
Second, by requmng students (or, perhaps, students' guardians) to take a 
positive step for exclusion, the current opt out procedure imposes a burden on 
students who do not share the beliefs of the dominant religion. 142 In Leirvag 
138 La11• I' Canada (Minister of Emplo;m ent and Immigration) [1999] I SCR 497 , 524 (SC) Iacobucci 
J. 
139 Butler and Butler, above n 82, 502; Huscroft, above n 131, 386-388. 
140 Butler and Butler, above n 82, 500 . 
141 La\\l v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , above n 138 , 547-548. 
142 See the appellants ' arguments in Canadian Civil Liberties v Ontario (Edu cation Minister) (1990) 
71 OR (2d) 341 , 379 (Ont CA). 
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(above), 143 the HCR held that the pai1ial exemption policy regarding the CK.REE 
1 d. · · 144 c ass was 1scnmmato1y: 
... the present system ... imposes a considerable burden on persons in the position of 
the authors, in so far as it requires them to acquaint themselves with those aspects of 
the subject which are clearly of a religious nature, as well as with other aspects, with 
a view to determining which of the other aspects they may feel a need to seek- and 
justify-exemption from. 
While it was implicit that a blanket exemption policy (as operates in ew Zealand 
schools) would not be found to be discriminatory, there seems to be no reason why 
the slightly lesser onus of opting out of the whole class (rather than carefully selected 
pai1s of it) fails to impose an (albeit less severe) burden on children and their 
guardians. Thus , the holding of religious activities fails to differentiate between 
children of different religions in a manner that involves disadvantage to those 
students whose beliefs do not accord with the pa.I1icular religion that the activities 
reflect. It therefore constitutes a prima facie breach of section 19. 
B Does the Teaching of Religious Education and Other 'Non-Indoctrinating' 
Subjects Constitute a Prima Facie Breach? 
Thus far, this Pa11 has found that school activities of an ove11ly religious and 
indoctrinating character constitute a p1ima facie breach of sections 13 and 19. Yet 
what of avowedly 'secular' education that aims to info1m students about the different 
religions of the world or different conceptions of the good life? In the United States, 
this question has been raised by fundamentalist communities uncomfo11able with the 
increasingly multicultural values promoted by state schools. However, the issue's 
implications extend far beyond fundamentalist communities to the ve1y 
underpinnings of education itself: if 'secular' education is not neutral , then all 
education is indoctrination. 
143 See Part VII A 1 Section 13: Freedom of religion . 
144 leirvag and others v No1way, above n 115, 15 . 
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l Section 13: Freedom of religion 
The overwhelming majo1ity of international juiisprudence presumes that 
'secular' education is neutral. While religious education exposes children to different 
religions and cultural practices, for instance, it is generally understood to do so in an 
'objective' manner, allowing each individual child to 'critique' the available life-
options. As such, it is thought that secular teaching cannot encroach on students' right 
to "hold opinions without interference" 145 or to be free from coercion to change their 
1. . h. 1 b 1· c. 146 re 1g1ous or et 1ca e 1e1s. 
This approach is exemplified by the HRC General Comment on the ICCPR 
freedom of religion provisions. While ruticle 18.4 requires states to respect pru·ents' 
right to educate their children in accordance with their religious convictions, 
147 the 
Committee maintains that this requirement does not preclude eve1ything of religious 
subject matter being taught in schools. Rather, "article 18.4 permits public school 
instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given 
in a neutral and objective way". 148 Similarly, the Ontario Couit of Appeal has stated 
that "the Canadian Chruter prohibits religious indoctrination but it does not prohibit 
d . b 1 · . " 149 e ucat1on a out re 1g1on . 
Although this equivalence between 'secular' and 'neutral' has significant 
support, it is by no means impregnable. Indeed, to members of some religions, the 
'critical' or 'objective' approach to life options that it is an aim of secular education 
145 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section 13. 
146 R v Big Drug Mart Ltd, above n 99,354. 
147 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 104, art 18.4 provides: 
The States Pa11ies to the present Covenant unde11ake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, 
when applicable, legal guardian to en ure the religiou and moral education of their children in 
confonnity with their own convictions. 
148 United Nations Human Rights Committee, above n 114, para 6 (my emphasis). 
149 Canadian Civil Liberties v Ontario, above n 142,367. 
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to encourage is the very thing that they believe their religions prohibit. 150 To these 
(fundamentalist) religious minorities, cultivation of individual judgement and rational 
thought is itself a form of indoctrination, because it imposes values on their children 
that are contrary to their religious beliefs. As an American academic notes, this 
concept is by no means easy to understand: 151 
The fundamentalists' argument against exposure [to critical thought] is truly difficult 
for one raised in the liberal tradition to grasp, because it relies on a dizzying 
subversion of the contrast between the objective and inculcative methods of 
education .... Such a viewpoint challenges the conventional wisdom that critical 
reflection , rational thought and individual choice are the antithesis of, and the best 
safeguards against, indoctrination. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the contention 1s that all education 1s 
indoctrination. 152 
The fundamentalists' attempt to exempt their children from perceived secular 
indoctrination has been advanced in several American cases with varying success. In 
Wisconsin v Yoder, 153 members of an Old Order Amish community argued that their 
children should not have to attend school beyond age fomteen, as required by a state 
compulsory education law. Attending secondaiy school, it was argued, "tends to 
emphasise intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, 
competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students" - values that 
the Amish consider contrary to their religion. 154 Upholding the plaintiffs' case, the 
United States Supreme Cou1t found that the state's interest in compelling Amish 
children's school attendance until age 16 did not outweigh the plaintiffs' religious 
150 Stolzenberg, above n 58 , 591. 
15 1 Stolzenberg, above n 58 , 613 . 
152 Rishworth "Biculturalism, Multiculturalism, the Bill of Rights and the School Cuniculum", above n 
30 , 40 . 
153 Wisconsin v Yoder [1972] 406 US 205 (USSC). 
154 Wisconsin v Yoder, above n 153, 211 Burger CJ for the Court. 
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1ights. In so doing, it emphasised the "static" 155 and "self-sufficient" nature of the 
Amish culture, 156 and the fact that it is "separated from the outside world". 157 
In Mo::.ert v Hawkins County School Board, 158 the plaintiffs' claim met with 
less success. There, fundamentalist Christian parents did not want to remove their 
children from the public school system; rather, they wanted the public school system 
to accommodate their religious beliefs. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the 
reading cuniculum at their children's state school, believing it to depict a wide 
va1iety of 'anti-Christian' ideas including witchcraft and mental telepathy. Seeking an 
exemption for their children, the plaintiffs submitted that, in exposing their children 
to a diversity of values and beliefs, the cuniculum infringed their children's religious 
1ights. This argument was not accepted by the courts, however, who interpreted the 
plaintiffs' case as an1ounting to a plea for immunity from "mere offence" - a 
protection that is not encompassed by the 1ight of religious freedom. 159 As the above 
discussion demonstrates, however, the judges' analysis failed to grasp the essence of 
the plaintiffs' argument: in seeking the right to exempt their children from class, the 
plaintiffs wished to protect their children not just from offence but from 
indoctrination. 160 
Thus, while the American jurisprudence suggests that 'secular indoctrination' 
arguments can only constitute a prim a facie breach of the 1ight to religious freedom 
when they emanate from isolated, self-sufficient communities, this approach is based 
on a misunderstanding of the argument at stake. In direct contrast to the approach of 
the HRC and Canadian courts, it seems that there is no 'b1ight line' between 
education and indoctrination; just as instruction in religion can operate to coerce 
155 Wisconsin v Yoder, above n 154, 229, 234 Burger CJ for the Court. 
156 Wisconsin v Yoder, above n 154, 222 Burger CJ for the Court. 
157 Wisconsin v Yoder, above n 153, 217 Burger CJ for the Court. 
158 Mozer/ v Hawkins County School (1987) 827 F 2d 1066 (6th Cir). 
159 Rishworth, above n 30, 40. 
160 See Stolzenberg, above n 58,613. 
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children to adopt the religious beliefs of the majority, so too can education about 
religion coerce children to adopt the 'objective', 'rational' approach that is at the 
hea11 of the ' secular education ' ethos - an ethos that is itself anathema to some 
religions. While, as with religious instruction and observance, the legislature has 
provided parents with the oppo11unity to opt their children out of a particular class or 
subject on religious or cultural grounds, for the reasons stated above this procedure 
does not remove the element of coercion that it is the role of section 13 to prevent. 161 
Despite international jurisprudence to the contrary, a failure to recognise that 
avowedly 'secular' education has the potential to constitute a p1ima facie breach of 
section 13 would be unp1incipled. 
2 Section 19: Freedom from discrimination 
Just as religious education and other 'secular' classes have the potential to 
breach children ' s and guardians ' religious freedom 1ights, so too can they be seen to 
violate section 19. First (applying the approach to discrimination discussed above), 
the effect of such education is to make a distinction between students whose beliefs 
allow them to pai1icipate in the paiticular class at issue and students whose beliefs 
preclude such pai1icipation. Second, this distinction is on the basis of a prohibited 
ground - namely, religious and ethical belief 162 Third, the distinction involves 
disadvantage towards the disfavoured group: the educational value of the pa1ticulai· 
class is withheld from students whose religious beliefs prevent their attendance. If 
multiple classes are at issue, students may be unable to attend (secular) state 
education at all. Where this situation applies , students and their familie s will incur the 
burden (both practical and economic) of attending private schools. A p1ima facie 
breach is therefore made out. 
161 See Part VII A I Section 13: Freedom o f relig ion. 
162 N ew Zealand Human Rights Act 1993, section 2 1 (I )(c), (d). 
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C Does the State's Omission to Fully Fund Integrated Schools of a Religious 
Character Constitute a Prima Facie Breach? 
Distinct from the issue of daily school content' s compatibility with religious 
beliefs is the matter of the state's right (or duty) to provide for religious schools 
within the state system. That children and guardians have a tight to attend religious 
schools of their choice is well established in international jurisprndence. 163 However, 
does the state have a duty to fund religious schools that agree to be part of the state 
system? As the law stands, the state covers all integrated schools' expenses except for 
land and buildings. Ought the state to also provide for these necessities? 
1 Section 13: Freedom of religion 
As outlined above, international religious freedom jmisprndence interprets the 
right to hold religious and ethical beliefs without interference in a broad sense, 
finding it to include indirect fonns of control that can coerce people to change their 
beliefs. Whether this approach applies in New Zealand is yet to be detennined. 
However, the possibility that section 13 might impose a "general positive duty" on 
the state to protect religious has already been mled out. 164 Jn Mendelssohn v Attorney-
General, the Comt of Appeal found section 13 to amount only to a negative duty; it 
protects an individual's right to hold religious and ethical beliefs free from (direct) 
state interference. 165 While the Court acknowledges that there may be situations in 
which the state is obliged to legislate in order to protect religion (the international 
obligation to proscribe religious hate speech constituting one example), 166 such an 
obligation is stated not to apply to education. 167 Refening specifically to the 1975 
Act, the Comt argues that it does not support the existence of a positive duty to 
163 See, fo r ins tance, Adler " Ontario [1996] 3 SCR 609 (SCC) 699-700 Sopinka J; lntemational 
Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, above n 66, a11 13 .3. 
164 Mendelssohn v Attorney-General, above n 97, 276. 
165 Mendelssohn v Altorney-Genera/, above n 97, 273. 
166 International Covenant on C ivil and Political Rights, above n I 04 , a11 20(2). 
167 Mendelssohn v Attorney-General, above n 97 , 27 5. 
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protect religion 168 but rather demonstrates the power of the state to exercise such 
protection when it chooses to do so. 169 
This approach is suppo1ted by Canadian autho,ities, which directly address 
the issue of whether the state's omission to fund private religious schools breaches 
the religious freedom provision of the Charter. In Adler v Ontario, the justices of the 
Supreme Comt who deal with the issue agree that the right to religious freedom does 
not require the state to fund religious schools. 170 It is maintained that parents are not 
compelled to send their children to (secular) state schools, and hence that their 
religious freedom is not compromised: 171 
The burden complained ofby the appellants, viz. the cost of sending their children to 
private schools, being not a prohibition of a religious practice but rather the absence 
of funding for one, has not historically been considered a violation of the freedom of 
religion. 
Despite the consensus between New Zealand and Canadian comts, one 
suspects that the operating word in this passage may soon be "historically". There 
seems to be some inconsistency between the (Canadian) asse,tion that, on the one 
hand, the nub of religious freedom is the tight to hold beliefs without indirect 
interference, and that, on the other hand, the state's omission to fund religious schools 
does not amount to coercion. Indeed , the state's provision of free secular education 
can be conceptualised as an economic incentive that does in fact compel people to 
attend (secular) state schools, thereby rendering their religious beliefs vulnerable. 
According to this approach, the state's failure to fully fund integrated schools could 
amount to a prima facie breach of the right to religious freedom, not because the state 
has a positive obligation to protect religion but because the omission may breach the 
state's negative duty not to interfere indirectly with individuals' beliefs. Of course, 
168 Mendelssohn v Attorney-General, above n 97 , 276. 
169 Hannan, above n 21 , 135-136. 
170 Adler v Ontario, above n 163 , 652 L' Heureux- Dube J, 711-7 13 McLachlin J. 
17 1 Adler v Ontario , above n 163 , 652 L'Heureux- Dube J. This reasoning is applied in Bal v Ontario 
(A ttorney-General) 1997 34 (OR) 3d 484 (Ont CA) . 
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this argument is in direct conflict with Adler and Mendelssohn, and is therefore at 
odds with Canadian and New Zealand law as it stands. Although the state's failure to 
fully fund religious schools does not an1ount to a ptima facie breach of religious 
freedom rights at present, there is potential for the law's development to find such a 
breach in the future. 
2 Section 19: Freedom.from discrimination 
Section 13 , then, does not cutTently oblige the state to fund integrated schools. 
However, section 19 can be argued to suggest otherwise. Turning first to the issue of 
whether the state's failure to provide full funding makes a distinction between 
different groups, it seems that an indirect distinction exists. As the Canadian Supreme 
Cou1t acknowledges in Adler, the attendance of schools that promote a pa1ticular faith 
is itself a tenet of some religions. 172 Thus, L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin JJ argue, 
the state's failure to fund religious schools makes a distinction between those students 
whose religious and ethical beliefs allow them to attend (secular) state schools, and 
those whose beliefs prevent their attendance. 173 Such a distinction is obviously on the 
basis of an enumerated ground - namely, religious or ethical belief 174 
Sopinka and Major JJ , however, di sagree with this conclusion. They contend 
that it is not the legis lation that creates the distinction, but rather the religious and 
ethica l beliefs to which different children and their fan1ilies adhere. 175 In other words, 
in 'choosing' to adopt a patticular religion, individuals are themselves the cause of 
any distinction that arises. Yet as L'Heureux- Dube J indicates, the individual 
children and guardians in question do not regard themselves as having a 'choice' .176 
Moreover, even if the selection of one's beliefs does allow room for choice, that 
172 Adler v Ontario, above n 163 , 656 L'Heureux- Dube J. 
173 Adler v Ontario , above n 163,656 L' Heureux-D ubeJ, 7 16-7 17 McLachlan J. 
174 New Zea land Human Rights Act 1993 , section 2 1( l)(c) , (d). 
175 Adler v Ontario , above n 163, 705 , 708 Sopinka J (Major J concurrin g). 
176 Adler v Ontario , above, n 163, 657 L'lleureux-Dube J, 7 16-7 17 McLachlan J . 
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choice cannot be relevant in determining whether disc1imination has occurred. If state 
action that disc1iminates on the ground of religion can be excused because religion is 
a choice, then discrimination on that basis will become an "empty concept". 177 
Having established that the state's failure to fully fund religious schools 
creates a distinction between comparable groups on the basis of an enumerated 
ground, it is necessary to consider whether that distinction involves disadvantage to 
one group. Here, that requirement is clearly met. By rendering state schools 
acceptable only to those whose religious and ethical beliefs allow their attendance, 
the benefit of (fully) funded education is denied to those whose beliefs do not. The 
state's omission to fully fund integrated schools is thus a prima facie breach of 
section 19. 
D Does the State's Decision to (Partially) Fund Integrated Schools of a 
Religious Character Constitute a Prima Facie Breach? 
Thus far it has been seen that the state's failure to fully fund integrated 
schools constitutes a prima facie breach of section 19. Although completely at odds 
with this finding, some case law suggests that the state's decision to pa1tially fund 
integrated schools may also breach the BORA. This section investigates such a 
possibility. 
1 Section 13: Freedom ofreligion 
It is widely recognised that the mere recognition of one group's anti-
discrimination rights cannot, of itself, violate the 1ights of another. 178 In Bal v 
Ontario, 179 however, the Ontario Court (General Division) indicates that something 
more substantive is involved here: if the most convenient state school for a child to 
177 Adler v Ontario, above, n 163,657 L'Heureux-Dube J. 
178 See, for instance, Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698, para 46. 
179 Bal v Ontario (Attomey-General) 1994 21 OR 3d 68 1, 707-709 (Gen Div). 
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attend is a religious school (the religion of which the child does not share), then that 
child must either attend a less convenient school or seek an exemption from the 
religious elements of the most convenient school's programme. 
180 These hurdles 
inhibit the attainment of education that is compatible with the child's beliefs. Thus, 
the Cha1ter may preclude the state from operating religious schools within the state 
system, even if they are attended only by those who choose to do so. 
This reasonmg suggests that New Zealand's prutial funding of integrated 
schools (which allows for their very existence) impinges on children's right not to be 
coerced into adopting a pa.1ticula.1· religious or ethical belief Of course, the practical 
reality is that, in New Zealand, all children can attend (reasonably) convenient state 
schools. The issue is not one of bru·e possibility, however, as of degree. While the 
mere existence of an even more convenient integrated school does not negate the 
existence of a reasonably, although slightly less , convenient state school, the greater 
convenience of the integrated school constitutes an incentive that can operate to 
coerce children's attendance. Thus, the legislature's decision to (partially) fund 
integrated schools is a prima facie breach of section 13. 
2 Section 19: Freedom/ram discrimination 
The prutial funding (and hence existence) of integrated schools can also be 
ru·gued to infringe the anti-discrimination rights of children and guru·dians whose 
most convenient school expounds a religious or ethical belief that they do not shru·e. 
First, the impact of the decision creates an (indirect) distinction between those 
students whose beliefs allow them to attend the most convenient school and those 
whose beliefs prevent this attendance. Second, that distinction is on the basis of a 
prohibited ground - namely, religious or ethical belief. 181 Finally, the distinction 
180 Bal v Ontario (A ttorney-General) (Gen Div) , above n 179, 707-709. While these observations were 
on ly obiter, Winkler J's reasoning as a whole is affi1med by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bal I' 
Onatario (Attorney-General) (CA), above n 171. And see Rod Wiltshire "The Right to 
Denominational Schools Within Ontario Public School Boards" ( 1996) 7 Educ & LJ 81 , 81-82. 
181 New Zealand Human Rights Act section 21 (1 )(c), (d). 
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involves the same disadvantages as noted above - that is, the need to either attend a 
less convenient school or to seek exemption from the religious aspects of the local 
school. Thus, the funding of religious schools also constitutes a prima facie breach of 
section 19. 
E A Conflict of Rights 
It can be seen that, once the various issues su1Tounding religion in schools are 
delineated, what is left is a veritable quagmire of conflicting and competing prima 
facie breaches. On the one hand, religious instruction in schools infiinges children's 
and guardians' religious and anti-discrimination rights; on the other hand, teaching 
about religion - and, indeed, any other 'secular' subject - also violates the religious 
and anti-discrimination rights of a fundamentalist minority. Do these findings mean 
that all education must be prohibited? Additionally, both the decision to fund and the 
decision not to fund religious schools contravene a cocktail of religious and anti-
discrimination rights. On what basis should the state progress? 
The only New Zealand case to address the issue of conflicting rights is Re 
J, 182 in which Jehovah Witness parents wished to prevent their child from having a 
blood transfusion. The Cou11 of Appeal conceptualised this scenaiio as involving a 
potential conflict between the parents ' right to religious freedom and the child's right 
to life. In resolving the conflict, Gault J defined the 1ight to freedom of religion so 
that it does not impinge upon the right to life. 183 That is, he limited one of the 
potentially conflicting rights at the p1ima facie stage, implicitly creating a hierarchy 
of rights under which life is superior to religious freedom. In this way, a conflict of 
1ights is avoided. 
Applying the Cow1's approach to the factual matrix at hand, however, a 
problem is encoW1tered. Not only does 'religion in education' , as a broad area of 
182 Re J (an Infant): Band B v Director-Genem/ of Social We(fare [1996] 2 NZLR 134 (CA). 
183 Re J (an Infant): Band B v Director-General of Social Welfare, above n 182, 146 Gault J for the 
Cow1. 
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enquiry, involve conflict between different rights, but there is also conflict between 
different individuals' enjoyment of the same right. With regard to the funding of 
integrated schools, for instance, the anti-discrimination rights of children from 
religious minorities conflict with the anti-discrimination rights of children who do not 
belong to those minorities: as soon as the state gives effect to the rights of minorities 
by removing the financial burden of attending religiously appropriate schools then it 
imposes a burden on children whose beliefs do not accord with those espoused by 
such schools to attend less convenient institutions. These intra-right conflicts cannot 
be resolved through definitional tweaking. 
An alternative approach is provided by Canadian jurisprudence. Instead of 
addressing potential conflicts at the prima facie stage, they can be resolved under 
section 5, which allows rights to be subject to "such reasonable limits as are 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". This approach, which is 
known as 'ad hoe balancing', 
184 thus makes use of the structure that Parliament has 
provided for the limiting and qualification of rights. Of particular relevance to the 
conflicting and competing prima facie rights at hand is the way in which ad hoe 
balancing resolves the conflict in the context in which it arises. In so doing, the 
approach avoids the potential for rights to be limited at the definitional stage in a 
manner that may not always be appropriate. 
185 
While the definitional balancing of conflicting rights has thus far been 
favoured by the New Zealand comts, academics prefer the ad hoe approach. 
186 In 
light of the inability of definitional balancing to resolve the multifarious prima facie 
breaches pertaining to religion in education, it is evident that the ad hoe approach 
must be applied. First, however, it needs to be detennined whether it is legal for the 
state and school boards to commit these prima facie breaches. 
184 Rish worth, Huscroft, Optican and Mahoney The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 131 , 56. 
185 See Julia Rendall Veiled Witnesses, Fair Trials and the Bill of Rights: A Case Note on Police v 
Razamjoo (LLB Hons Research Paper) Victoria University of Wellington, 2005. 
186 See Andrew S Butler " Limiting Rights" (2002) 33 YUWLR 537, 546-550; Rishwo11h , Huscroft , 
Optican and Mahoney The New Zealand Bill of Rights A et, above n 131, 56. 
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VIII ARE THE PRIMA FACIE BREACHES SAVED BY SECTION 4? 
Unlike the human 1ights documents of some other states, New Zealand's 
BORA is not supreme law. Section 4 provides that the comts are not to impliedly 
repeal or decline to apply any statutory provision by reason of its inconsistency with 
the BORA. As section 6 states, however, where an enactment can be given a meaning 
that is consistent with the BORA, that meaning is to be prefened. In Moonen, the 
Court of Appeal dealt with the tension between these two sections by first asking 
whether the legislative provision in question is open to more than one "tenable 
meaning". 187 If it is, then the meaning that constitutes the "least possible limitation" 
on the right is to be adopted. 188 This section will apply such a process to the 
legislation pertaining to each of the prima facie breaches in tum. In so doing, it will 
establish how the state and school boards can act under the present law. 
A Religious Instruction and Observances in Schools 
As found above, 189 the holding of religious instruction and observance in all 
schools constitutes a prima facie breach of sections 13 and 19. Are the legislative 
provisions under which these activities are held properly open to an interpretation that 
precludes the breaches, or places a lesser limitation on rights? 
1 State prima,y schools 
Religious activities m state pnmary schools are ostensibly authorised by 
sections 78 and 78A of the 1964 Act. It does not seem that the provisions are open to 
more than one tenable meaning. While the phrase "religious instruction" could 
arguably, on its own, be interpreted as 'instruction about religion', the addition of the 
187 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, above n 94, 16. 
188 Moonen, above n 94, 16. 
189 See Pa11 Vil A Does the Holding ofReligious Observance or Instruction Constitute a Prima Facie 
Breach? 
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phrase "given by voluntary instrnctors approved by the School Committee" renders 
this interpretation untenable. In enabling school boards to choose their own religious 
instrnctors, the legislature clearly intended to allow them to select teachers who 
follow an exclusively Ch1isrian approach that is designed to indoctrinate. Thus, in 
accordance with section 4, it is legal for state primary schools to hold religious 
instrnction and observances, including those designed to indoctrinate children. 
190 
2 Integrated prima,y schools 
Section 32 of the 1975 Act provides that, in integrated schools for which 
religion fo1ms pai1 of their special character, religious instrnction and observance can 
be held "in accordance with the tenns and conditions prescribed in [their] integration 
agreement[s]". These agreements can allow for religious activities that "accord with 
practices, rites and doctrines of a designated religious or philosophical body as from 
time to time detem1ined by a designated member or designated members of that 
body" .191 That such activities may amount only to instrnction about religion is not an 
interpretation that is properly open under section 6. So long as their integration 
agreements provide for it, integrated schools can legally hold religious activities of an 
indoctrinating nature. 
3 Private prima,y schools and all seconda,y schools 
As provided by section 81 of the 1964 Act, "nothing in [that] Act shall affect 
religious instrnction or observances in schools other than State primaiy schools" . 
When enacted, this provision was intended to allow p1ivate and seconda1y schools to 
hold religious activities that extend beyond those pennitted in state primary 
schools. 192 Indeed, that more extensive religious content is pe1mitted in schools other 
190 Paul Rishwo11h "The Human Rights Act and Discrimination" in Paul Rishw011h, Patrick Wal h 
Education l a 11• (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 1999) 127. 
191 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, section 7(6)(f) . 
192 Hon WB Tennent (9 November 1962) 332 N ZPD 2569 . 
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than state primary schools is clearly the implication of the provision. As section 6 
indicates, however, mere implication is not necessarily sufficient in light of the 
BORA. Section 6 requires the cow1, in its interpretive role, to apply the meaning that 
places the least possible limitation on the right not only if it is the 'natural' meaning 
but also if it is merely "tenable". Is an interpretation of section 81 that precludes 
private and secondary schools from holding religious instruction and observance 
properly open? 
The courts have taken a varied approach to detennining whether 
interpretations are tenable in border-line cases. In Quilter, the Com1 of Appeal was 
unanimous that the Maniage Act cannot properly be interpreted to allow for same-sex 
marriages, even though the requirement that marriage is between a man and a woman 
is not specified. The cou11s may interpret, states Tipping J, but they "cannot rewrite or 
legislate". 193 In criminal procedure cases, however, the cou11s have demonstrated 
willingness to adopt seemingly strained interpretations in order to give effect to 
1ights. In R v Poumako, for instance, Gault J left open the possibility that the 
retrospectivity clause in the Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1999 could be 
interpreted to apply for only 15 days, as opposed to the indefinite period that a natural 
reading suggested. 
In attempting to reconcile these divergent approaches, it is impo11ant to note 
the different nature of the respective 1ights at stake. 194 Whereas Poumako involved a 
procedural 1ight, Quilter concerned a social policy issue. While not rendered explicit 
in either case, perhaps it is this distinction that drives the Cow1 of Appeal's disparate 
findings regarding what interpretations are tenable. Applying such an approach to 
section 81, it is clear that religion's place in schools is a matter of social policy, not 
procedure. Thus, while the issue is by no means clear-cut, it is likely that the cou11s 
193 Quilter, above n 127, 572. 
194 See C Geiringer, "Parsing Sir Kenneth Keith's Taxonomy of Human Rights: A Commentary on 
Illingwo11h and Evans Case" in R Bigwood (ed) Public /11/eresr Litigation (LexisNexis. 2006) 176. 180-184, 
although tl1at a11icle is concerned with defining rights rather than section 4 and 6 analyses. 
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would show deference to Parliament 's infeITed intention to hold that section 81 does 
not rest1ict religious activities in private and secondary schools. 
B Religious Education and Other 'Non-Indoctrinating' Subjects 
Just as this paper has detem1ined religious instruction and observance to 
constitute a prima facie breach of some students' rights , so too did it find religious 
education and other 'secular' subjects to have the potential to infiinge the BORA. 
195 
Are these p1ima facie breaches saved by section 4? 
1 State prima,y schools, state seconda,y schools and integrated schools 
The state 's power to require schools to instil students with a 'critical' or 
'objective' approach to life options is confened by section 60A of the 1989 Act, 
which empowers the Minister to publish national education goals and cutTiculum 
statements . 196 The provision cannot be given a tenable meaning that precludes the 
state from requiring schools to follow an 'objective' approach. Such an interpretation 
would be so far from Parliament's intention that it would an1ount to judicial 
legislation. At present, a 'pluralistic' perspective is required by cmTiculum 
statements, with a basic principle being to "encourage students to understand and 
respect the different cultures which make up New Zealand society". 197 Today, then , 
state and integrated schools are legally required to promote a mind-set that 
contravenes the religious freedom and anti-discrimination 1ights of some 
fundamentalist mino1ities. 
195 See Pa11 VIT B Does the Teaching of Religious Education and other 'Non- Indoctrinating' Subjects 
Constitute a P1ima Facie Breach? 
196 Educa ti on Act I 989, sections 60A( l )(a), 60A( l)(aa), 60A( l )(b). 
197 Ministry o f Ed ucation Th e New Zealand Curricu lum Fram ework "The Principles" 
<http: //www.tki.org. nz> ( last accessed 26 September 2006). 
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2 Private schools 
Section 35A of the 1989 Act requires that, in order to be registered, p1ivate 
schools must prove that they have a "suitable" curriculum. 198 Whether this 
requirement is met is a matter for the Ministry's chief executive to decide. 199 As 
noted above,200 a curriculum is probably "suitable" if it is reasonably similar to that 
followed by state and integrated schools. At present, such a requirement would 
require p1ivate schools' cuITicula to promote an 'objective' or 'pluralistic' world-
view. While the issue is more contentious than for state and integrated schools, then, 
it is likely that section 4 also allows (and, indeed, requires) private schools to 
contravene the rights of those whose religious beliefs prohibit exposure to an 
'objective' or 'critical' perspective. 
C Partial Funding of Integrated Schools 
Quite apait from the content of classes, this paper has also found that the 
state's decision to paitially fund integrated schools constitutes a prima facie breach of 
the BORA in two ways: first, by omitting to fully fund such schools; and second, by 
deciding to provide them with any funding at all. Are the legislative provisions under 
which paitial funding occurs properly open to an interpretation that places a lesser 
limitation on the 1ights at stake? 
1 The state's omission to jitlly jimd integrated schools 
Section 40(2) of the 1975 Act provides that, except if stated otherwise in 
integration agreements, proprietors of integrated schools "own, hold upon trust, or 
lease" schools' land and buildings,20 1 and "shall accept and meet the liability for all 
198 Education Act 1989, section 35A(I )(a). 
199 Education Act 1989, sections 2, 35A(8). 
200 See Part III C Private Primary Schools. 
20 1 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, section 40(2)(a). 
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mo11gages, liens and other charges upon the said land and buildings". 
202 Fui1her, 
integrated schools must pay for any improvements to school buildings and grounds 
that are required.203 These provisions' complete lack of ambiguity render it untenable 
to adopt any 'interpretation' that requires the state to fully fund integrated schools. 
2 The state's decision to partially fi111d integrated schools 
Integrated schools' receipt of state funding (except for land and buildings) is 
the effect of several legislative provisions. Section 4(1) of the 1975 Act states that, 
"[ o Jn integration, an integrated school becomes pai1 of the State system of education 
m ew Zealand"204 and is subject to the 1964 and 1989 Acts
205 (although, where 
there is conflict, the 1975 Act prevails).2
06 Fu11her, as noted above, section 36 allows 
integrated schools to charge "attendance dues".
207 These payments can only be used 
to meet costs relating to land and build ings.
208 When read in light of section 3 of the 
1989 Act, which states that, except as provided in the 1975 Act, "every person who is 
not a foreign student is entitled to free enrolment and free education at any school" 
during their school-attending years, the state's obligation to pai1ially fund integrated 
schools emerges. As the 1975 Act only allows integrated schools' attendance dues to 
meet costs regarding land and buildings, the state is required to fund all else. The 
legislative framework does not allow for any alternative inteipretation. 
202 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975 , section 40(2)(b). 
203 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, sections 40(2)(c), 40(2)(d). 
204 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act, section 4(1 )(a). 
205 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act, section 4(1 )(b). 
206 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act, section 80( I). 
207 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act. , section 36(1 ). 
208 Private Schools Conditional Integration Act, section 36(3). 
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IX ARE THE PRIMA FACIE BREACHES DEMONSTRABLY JUSTIFIED 
IN A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY? 
The conclusion that the pnma facie breaches of children ' s and guardians ' 
1ights are legal by virtue of section 4 does not signal the end of the matter. While 
courts are precluded from repealing statutes on the basis of BORA-inconsistency, the 
Court of Appeal has held that it is still open to com1s to issue a "declaration of 
inconsistency" .209 Such declarations notify Parliament that legislation conflicts with 
the BORA, affording it the opportunity to rectify the situation. Regardless of the 
finding that schools ' actions are legal pursuant to section 4 , it is thus necessary to 
consider whether the impugned legislation is itself inconsistent with the BORA. In 
accordance with section 5, such an enquiry requires investigating whether the prima 
facie breaches are "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" .2 10 
Before embarking on the BORA analysi s, this paper addressed the balance of 
decision-making power between children and their guardians.2 11 Yet these potentially 
competing interests form only part of the picture. Connected to the interest of 
guardians is the interest of the community (or communities) to which they belong in 
maintaining their cultural cohesion and beliefs . Beyond communities is the state 's 
interest in cultivating an infonned and hannonious citizemy that is capable of 
participating in the political and economic spheres of the nation. 2 12 It is the tension 
between the interests of these different social units that the section 5 analysis must 
address. 
209 Moonen, above n 94, 17 . No dec laration of inconsistency has yet been issued . 
210 New Zealand Bill o f Ri ghts Act 1990, section 5. 
211 See Part V Whose Rights Are At Stake? 
212 See Shauna Va n Praagh, "Fa ith , Belong ing, and the Pro tecti on of "O ur" Children" 1999 17 
Windsor YB Access to Just 154; Michae l Dav id Jordon "Parents' Rights and Children 's Interests" 
1997 I O Can J L & Juris 363 . 
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A well-established (although not mandato1y)21
3 test for section 5 justifiability 
is outlined by the Cou1t of Appeal in Moonen,
214 as adopted from the Canadian case 
of R v Oakes.215 The test involves two primary questions. First, does the legislation 
have a pressing and substantial objective? Second, are the statuto1y means used to 
achieve the objective propo1tional to its impo1tance?
216 In considering the second 
question, it must be established both whether there is a rational connection between 
the statuto1y means and the objective and whether the statuto1y measures impose but 
a minimal impai1ment on constitutional rights. A prima facie breach can only be 
justified under section 5 if it is detem1ined that all the relevant considerations are 
satisfied - a process that will "of necessity" involve value judgments.
217 This section 
applies the justifiability test to each of the prim a facie breaches identified above. In so 
doing it dete1mines whether ew Zealand's education framework is consistent with 
the BORA. 
A Is the State's Omission to Fully Fund Integrated Schools Justified? 
In allowing private schools to integrate into the state system, the legislature's 
purpose in omitting to provide full funding is unclear. Indeed, the possibility of 
extending funding to include land and buildings is not mentioned in the Parlian1entary 
Debates.218 Quite probably, it was assumed that fully funding such schools would be 
too expensive, although, in light of the state's commitment to free education,
219 the 
objective of avoiding this cost seems neither pressing nor substantial. In order to give 
the omission the best chance of being held justified under section 5, this paper will 
213 Moon en v Film and Literature Board of Review (No J ), above n 94 , 16; and see Moonen v Film and 
literature Board of Review (No 2) , above n 9 5, 760 . 
214 Moonen v Film and literature Board of Revieiv [2000] , above n 94 , 16. 
215 R v Oakes [I 986] I SCR I 03. 
216 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Revieiv, above n 94, 16. 
217 Moonen v Film and Litera/w·e Board of Review, above n 94, 16. 
218 (23 July 1975) 400 NZPD 3325-33 ; (24 July 1975) 400 NZPD 3343-52; (3 October 1975) 402 
NZPD 5109-14 ; (7 October 1975) 402 NZPD 5 I 83-22; (9 October 1975) 402 NZPD 5320 ; ( I 0 
October 1975) 402 NZPD 5433-6 . 
219 Education Act 1989, section 3. 
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assume that its purpose is the most principled available - namely, that provided by 
citizenship theorists. 
The argument from citizenship theo1y has become increasingly popular. 220 
Dismissing the notion that citizenship is simply about the acquisition of rights, these 
theorists contend that it entails the active exercise of responsibilities and vi,tues. In a 
modem liberal democratic state, the relevant virtues include "the ability and 
willingness to question political authority, and to engage in public discourse about 
matters of public policy". 221 A fundamental priority of education, then, is to 
constitute a "seedbe[ d] of civic vi11ue" - that is, to instil children with the vi11ues that 
they need in order to assume the responsibilities of good citizens.222 Assuming that 
such a seedbed can best be cultivated in secular state schools, citizenship theory 
suggests that the state's purpose in omitting to fully fund integrated schools is to 
encourage the attendance of their more 'civically virtuous' secular counterpai1s. 
That this purpose is pressing and substantial is argued strongly in much of the 
North American jurisprndence. In Mozert, above, Kennedy J emphasises the 
impo11ance of education's nmtu1ing children's capacity to "think c1itically about 
complex and controversial subjects" in order to participate actively in the democratic 
process. 223 In Adler, McLachlin J considers the pai1icular requirements for this 
objective to be achieved in a multicultural society:224 
A multicultural multireligious society can only work ... if people of all groups 
understand and tolerate each other. According to the Shapiro Repo11 ... , " the public 
school context represents the most promising potential for realising a more fully 
tolerant society" .... The strength of the public system is its diversity - diversity 
220 See, for instance, Richard Dagger "Education, Autonomy and Civic Vi11ue" in Richard Dagger 
Civic Virtues (Oxford University Press, Oxford , 1997) 117; Kevin McDonough, Walter Feinberg (eds) 
Education and Citizenship in liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and 
Collective Identities (Oxford University Press, Oxford , 2003). 
221 Will Kymlicka Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002) 289. 
222 Kymlicka, above n 221,302,307. 
223 Mo:::ert v Hawkins County School, above n 158 , I 070. 
224 Adler v Ontario , above n 163, 718 McLachlin J. 
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which its suppm1ers believe will lead to increased understanding and respect for 
different cultures and beliefs. 
In this way, McLachlin J held that the pri.ma facie breach of children's and guardians' 
anti-discrimination rights is justified in a free and democratic society. 
While the rheto1ic of citizenship theo1y is attractive, it 1s imp011ant to 
remember that Canada and New Zealand are liberal democracies, not civic republics. 
As such, they ought not to require public-spi1ited aims to govern citizens' actions in 
eve1y area of their lives.
225 While some may regard the construction of an info1med 
and tolerant citizemy as the primary benefit of education, it is not the only benefit. 
Others may emphasise, for instance, the importance of education for personal 
fulfilment. Fm1her, even were good citizenship the primaiy concern of every New 
Zealander, the ability to pai1icipate in a multicultural society is not the only relevant 
virtue. Law-abidingness and the development of personal and family relationships are 
also necessaiy in liberal democracies, 
226 and may (arguably) be nurtured just as 
effectively in an homogenous school environment as in a heterogeneous one. The 
aims of citizenship theo,y, then, are not sufficiently pressing and substantial to justify 
the infringement of children and guardians' anti-discrimination 1ights. At this stage, it 
seems that the state's omission to fully fund integrated schools is not demonstrably 
justified. 
B Is the State's Decision to (Partially) Fund Integrated Schools Justified? 
If the state's om1ss1on to provide full funding were the only prima facie 
breach pe11aining to religious schools, then the inadequacy of citizenship theo1y to 
justify the po !icy would, in the absence of further justification, be sufficient to require 
full funding to commence. After all, the onus of proving that prima facie breaches are 
justified rests squai·ely with those who have perpetrated them -
227 here, the state. 
225 Galston "Parents, Government, and Children" in Stephen Macedo, Iris Marion Young (eds) Child, 
Family, and State Nomos XLIV (New York Univers ity Press, New York and London, 2002) 211 , 213
. 
226 Galston, above n 225,230 . 
227 Minist1 y o.fTramport v Noori, above n 123 , 283 Richardson J. 
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However, a fu11her prima facie breach is at issue - namely, the state's decision to 
partially fund religious schools. In light of this conflicting breach, one set of rights 
must give way: either full funding must commence, or no funding should be provided 
at all. 
Once again, the first step is to consider whether the purpose of the impugned 
provisions is pressing and substantial. When Parliament made provision for the 
pai1ial funding of p1ivate schools through their integration into the state system, a 
number of factors were at play. P1imarily, the legislation was passed in order to save 
the financially imperilled Catholic schools from closure.228 Yet Pai·liainent decided 
not to fund only Catholic schools; nor did it simply provide state aid to private 
schools, which would also have solved the Catholic school problem. Instead , 
Pai·liament opted to open up the possibility of (guaranteed) pa11ial funding to all 
private schools through integration. In so doing, the then-Minister emphasised the 
new scheme's importance for the education system as a whole:229 
... the Bill ... will prove of mutual benefit to both private schools and the State 
system. The former will gain relief from financial and staffing problems, and at the 
same time preserve their special character; the State system will have access to . .. 
additional expe11ise . . . , together with a further diversity of approaches to education 
within the total system . 
The purpose of the funding is thus to allow for a new diversity of education within 
the state system, making room for schools of 'special character' to enter its ranks. As 
a corollary of this desired diversity, it seems that the legislation is intended to ensure 
that children have access to education that is culturally and religiously approp1iate. Is 
this objective pressing and substantial? 
In considering this question, it is necessaiy to identify the ve1y purpose of 
education. For liberals , education should serve to equip autonomous individuals with 
the capacity to question their fundamental values. It is only when individuals have 
228 Hon PA Amos (7 October 197 5) 402 NZPD 5138 . 
229 Hon PA Amos, above n 228 , 5184 . 
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autonomy that they can exercise choice about the basic commitments of their lives.
230 
For communitarians, however, the liberal conception of autonomy's impo1tance is 
overstated. This inflation of the significance of choice can "alienate us from some of 
the deepest aspects of human well-being", such as integration with one's culture.
231 
Whereas liberals seek to ensure that education does not 'trap' children within a 
culture's seemingly invaiiable values, communitarians emphasise culture's 
fundamental impo1iance in leading wo1ihwhile lives. 
Traditionally, these different perspectives were considered mutually 
exclusive. Applying them to the question of whether religiously appropriate 
education is pressing and substantial, it was assumed that liberals would answer in the 
negative and communitarians in the affirmative. Yet, as the political theo1ist Will 
Kymlicka demonstrates, liberals' and communitarians' concerns are not necessaiily 
itTeconcilable. As a liberal, Kymlicka believes that a precondition for leading 'the 
good life' is that individuals must be free to question and modify their beliefs. Where 
he has cont1ibuted to the liberal tradition is in his identification of conditions that are 
necessaiy in order for this freedom to be available. Far from assessing their values as 
atomised beings removed from the world , Kymlicka argues, individuals can only 
make life choices from within the context of their culture.
232 Access to one's culture 
is thus necessary in order to render meaningful the life options from which 
individuals can choose. For all children whose religion fo1ms an intrinsic part of their 
culture, then, attendance of religious schools is necessaiy in order for them to benefit 
from the objective of liberal education - namely, the fostering of individual 
autonomy. 
230 Eamonn Callan "Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy" (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1997) 52. 
231 Callan, above n 230, 52; see also Amitai Etzioni The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities 
and the Communitarian Agenda (Crown Publishers, New York , 1993) l O I . 
232 Will Kymlicka Multicultural Citi::enship: A Liberal Th eo1y o.f Minority Rights (Ox ford University 
Press, Oxford, 1995)75. 
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Kymlicka himself proposes that his argument from culture, while applying in 
theory equally to immigrant and indigenous peoples, in practice only imposes an 
obligation on the state in regard to the latter. Unlike indigenous groups, he maintains, 
immigrant minorities have already exercised their autonomy in choosing to live in a 
different culture, thus relinquishing their right to full cultural protection. 233 This 
stance, of course, is merely a sop to practicality; as several theorists have pointed out, 
the nature of individuals' culture should not impact upon their right to access it. 234 
For the purpose of this paper it is assumed that Kymlicka's distinction is invalid, and 
that the argument's logic leads inexorably to its being applied to all minority groups, 
indigenous and immigrant alike. In light of the above analysis, it follows that the 
purpose of providing culturally appropriate education for all children is pressing and 
substantial. 
Turning to the proportionality analysis, there is a rational connection between 
the purpose of maintaining the diversity of education available to children and the 
legislative means of funding integrated schools. After all, when the Act was passed in 
1975, it was only through the provision of state funding that many Catholic schools 
could remain open. Moreover, the impugned provisions impose but a minimal 
impairment on children's rights: 'secular' state schools also exist; children are not 
required to attend schools of a religious character; and even if they do , they can be 
exempted from overtly religious activities. 235 Thus, the state's partial funding of 
integrated schools is justified in a free and democratic society. As no justification for 
the state's omission to provide full funding was found above, it follows that the 
BORA requires the state to fully fund integrated schools. 
233 Will Kymlicka Multicultural Citi::enship , above n 232, 10-33 . 
234 Paul Gilbe11 Peoples, Cultures and Nations in Political Philosophy (Georgetown Uni vers ity Press, 
Washington DC, 2000) 179-180; see also Joseph Raz "Multi culturali sm: A liberal perspective" in 
Joseph Raz Ethics in th e Public Domain (OUP, Oxford, 1994) 158 , 160 . 
235 Education Act 1989, section 75A . 
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C Is the Teaching of Religious Education and Other 'Non-Indoctrinating' 
Subjects Justified? 
While the argument for the state's obligation to fund integrated schools is 
founded on liberal (rather than communitarian) p1inciples, its solution is acceptable to 
most minority groups. As the cases of Yoder and Mozert (above/
36 demonstrate, 
however, it is not acceptable to all. For although the Kymlicka-inspired argument 
obligates the state to fund religious schools that consent to integrate, this integration 
is conditional on schools' acceptance of the liberal good of individual autonomy (as 
represented by their obligation to comply with the national cuITiculum). While, under 
this model, children are educated in the context of their own culture, their education 
must include being presented with a range of life choices. The presence of children's 
cultural contexts is not to intrude to the extent that they are trapped within them. Yet 
it was the very manner in which education highlights the existence of alternative life-
options to which the plaintiffs in Yoder and Mozert objected. Whereas Kymlicka 
understands culture to provide the context of choice in which individuals can make 
life decisions , the mino1ity cultures represented in these cases regard part of their 
culture to be the exclusion of such choice. 
Any attempt to adduce the legislature's purpose in empowering the Ministry 
to require schools to instil students with an 'objective' mindset will invariably 
involve dabbling in fiction. That the Ministry should possess such a power is, in New 
Zealand society today, such an inevitability that Parliament would not have turned its 
collective mind to any alternative. If called upon to justify its approach, however, the 
state would probably light upon the liberal conception of education described above -
namely, foste1ing individual autonomy. 
In the context of a liberal democracy, this purpose must be regarded as 
pressing and substantial. After all, it fonns the ve1y foundation of such a society. 
236 See Part Vil B Does the Teaching of Religious Education and Other ' Non-Indoctrinating' Subjects 
Constitute a P,ima Fac ie Breach? 
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Turning to the proportionality analysis, there is a rational connection between the 
purpose and the statutory means: if the Ministry is not empowered to compel schools 
to comply with curriculum goals and guidelines, then the purpose of fostering 
students' autonomy (as required by those guidelines) could not be achieved. Fu11her, 
even though the statutory measures serve to severely impair the religious freedom and 
anti-discrimination rights of fundamentalist minorities , this impairment constitutes 
the minimum possible limitation in the circumstances. In state schools, students can 
be opted out of standard classes at the p1incipal's discretion.237 Where exemption is 
refused, however, the objective of fostering individual autonomy is so incompatible 
with the desire to limit such autonomy that a less significant impairment is 
impossible. For all the ticks in the justifiability boxes, however, the ultimate issue of 
whether the infringement is propo1tional to the statutory purpose remains 
problematic: Why should the priority that the majority places on individual autonomy 
justify imposing this value on those who do not hold it? 
The inability of Kymlicka's cultural theory to address the concerns of all 
minority communities is significant. Ultimately, however, it is not something with 
which the parameters of this paper require it to grapple. As noted above, this section's 
purpose is to conduct a human rights analysis within the context of section 5 of the 
BORA . By specifying that p1ima facie breaches do not violate the BORA if they are 
"justified in a free and democratic society", 238 section 5 prioritises policies that 
uphold these social characte1istics. For the purposes of this analysis, then, the breach 
of fundamentalist minorities ' religious freedom and anti-discrimination rights is 
proportional to the objective of promoting individual autonomy. The paradox of a 
tolerant society's intolerance for the intolerant239 is one that will be left for another 
day. 
237 Private Schoo ls Conditional Integra ti on Act 197 5, section 25A. 
238 N ew Zealand Bill o f Rights Act 1990 , sec ti on 5 (my emphasis). 
239 S to lzenberg, above n 58, 584 . 
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D Is Religious Instruction and Observance in State Schools Justified? 
Thus far, it has been established that the BORA requires the state to fully fund 
integrated schools, and that the possible breach of some fundamentalist minorities' 
rights not to be 'indoctrinated' by liberal education is justified in a free and 
democratic society. It remains to be seen whether the holding of religious instruction 
and observance in state schools is also justified. 
In introducing the 1962 Act, the then-Minister stated that its purpose was to 
legalise the elson System. In other words, Parliament wanted to allow religious 
activities of an indoctrinating nature to be held in state p1imary schools. 
240 Such 
legislation was desirable because it gave "expression to the wishes of the very great 
majority of parents".241 In the Minister's opinion, "no young person, boy or girl, is 
able to reach full development of character or of purpose in life without [religious 
instmction]". 242 Taking these reasons into account, is the purpose of legalising 
religious activities pressing and substantial? 
When the 1962 Act was introduced , New Zealand's Judeo-Christian heritage 
was subscribed to in some fo1m by the "very great majo1ity" of New Zealanders.
243 
As such, its presence in schools was arguably justified, as it reflected broad social 
consensus. In 2006, however, this consensus has disintegrated. While more than half 
of New Zealanders continue to adhere to Judeo-Christian faiths, 
244 significant 
minorities profess belief in other religions or in no religion at all. Yet even if the 
Judeo-Christian tradition undergoes a massive resurgence in suppo1t, it does not 
follow that the state is justified in allowing its schools to hold religious instruction 
and observance. Fundamental to the notion of 1ights is that they are not to be dictated 
240 Hon WB Tennent ( I 3 December I 962) 333 NZPD 3387. 
241 Hon WB Tennent, above n 240, 3387. 
242 Hon WB Tennent, above n 240, 3389. 
243 Hon WB Tennent, above n 240, 3387. 
244 Statistics New Zealand "Census snapshot: cu ltural diversity" <www.stats.govt.nz> ( last accessed 28 
September 2006). 
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by a tyranny of the majo1ity. This position 1s strongly stated by Thomas J m 
Q '/ 245 u1 ter: 
A majoritarian notion of " morality" is not a sufficient ba is to deny an unpopular 
minority the equal protection of the law. lndeed, it is because they are a minority and 
likely to be politically powerless that they require the protection of the law and equal 
treatment under the law . 
The mere fact that the majority of students at a state school wish to participate in 
religious activities does not justify encroaching upon the 1ights of those whose beliefs 
are incompatible with such attendance. Thus, the original purpose for which the 1962 
Act was introduced is not pressing and substantial. 
If required to justify the impugned provisions as they stand in the 1964 Act 
today, the state would probably refrain from attempting any argument that draws 
upon New Zealand's Judea-Christian heritage. Rather, the manner in which the 
legislation allows school boards to hold not only Ch1istian instruction and 
observance, but rather any religious activities of their choice, would be emphasised. 
In this way, a revised purpose might reflect that of the 1975 Act - namely, the 
facilitation of (the majo1ity of) children's access to education that is culturally and 
religiously appropriate. Does this alternative objective render the provisions 
demonstrably justified? 
Rather than approaching this question as a discrete matter, it is impo11ant to 
take the conclusions reached above into account. That the incorporation of religion 
within the education environment is necessa1y for children of some cultures (and 
hence a pressing and substantial objective) has already been established. In light of 
the finding that the state should fully fund integrated schools, however, this need is 
already met. The economic circumstances of families will not be a ban-ier to their 
children's attendance ofreligious schools. 
245 Quilter, above n 127, 545. 
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In the absence of fu11her justification, there is no rational connection between 
the objective of ensuring children's access to education that is culturally appropriate 
and the means of allowing religious activities to be held in state schools. Indeed, such 
a means has been demonstrated to impair the objective, as it results in school 
environments that are culturally inapprop1iate for those students who do not share the 
majority 's religious beliefs. Even if a rational connection were found, the opt out 
scheme does not impose the minimum possible impai1ment on 1ights. Unlike 
exemption from general classes, it would be feasible to implement an alternative opt 
in system (like that recently abandoned by the Ministry)
246 that would lessen the 
cuJTent infringements. Finding no fu11her justification for the breach of children's and 
guardians' 1ights, it is concluded that the legislation allowing religious activities to be 
held in state schools contravenes the BORA. 
X REFORMING THE LA W 
This paper has found that New Zealand 's education prov1s1ons breach the 
BORA in several ways. If the matters are litigated , it would be open to the coui1s to 
issue declarations of inconsistency. As provided by section 4, of course, Parliament 
has no obligation to rectify these breaches. If it wishes to , however, this section 
suggests how it might be achieved. 
A The 1964 Act 
One of this paper's conclusions is that the holding ofreligious instruction and 
observance in state schools contravenes the BORA. This breach can be remedied by 
repealing sections 78, 78A, 79, 80 and 81 of the 1964 Act. In this way, the secular 
requirement stands, but no exceptions allowing for religious activities in state primary 
schools remain. Fui1her, by repealing section 81, the implied authority for religious 
activities to be held in state secondary schools is also removed. To clarify this matter, 
a new subsection could be introduced stating that, 'Except as provided in the Private 
246 See Pa11 I Introduction. 
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Schools Conditional Integration Act 1975, no religious instruction or observance is to 
be held in state schools at any time'. 
B The 1975 Act 
In order for the 1975 Act to be consistent with the BORA, this paper has 
found that the state must fully fund integrated schools. If Parliament wishes to 
remedy the breach, then paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (g) and (h) of section 40(2) must 
be repealed. These paragraphs currently require integrated schools to provide their 
own land and buildings, to maintain them at the minimum standard set by the 
Ministry, and to ensure that they are approp1iately insured. As a consequential 
amendment, section 36, which allows integrated schools to charge attendance dues in 
order to meet costs regarding land and buildings, must also be repealed. If the state 
decides to meet these costs, then attendance dues are no longer necessary. Religiously 
appropriate education would become free for all. 
XI CONCLUSION 
Religion's place in education is a highly contested area. In New Zealand, 
current education policy draws a distinction between religious activities designed to 
indoctrinate and secular content intended to info1m. Whereas no limitation is placed 
on the latter, the fo1mer is sanctioned only in prescribed circumstances, as dictated by 
the type of school in which they are held. Despite this rest1iction on religious 
activities, however, schools that have a special religious character can integrate into 
the state system, receiving significant (although not full) funding. This paper has 
explored whether the cu1Tent anangements are consistent with the BORA. In 
pa11icular, it has considered the approp1iate balance between the interests of children 
and guardians, communities and the state. 
The tension between these interests is demonstrated by the a.ITay of prima 
facie breaches that the cunent framework raises. Far from falling into a neat pattern 
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indicating the best way fo1ward, the prima facie breaches compete and conflict so as 
to be irreconcilable. Not only do religious activities of an indoct1inating nature violate 
religious freedom and anti-discrimination 1ights, but 'secular' education is also 
inconsistent with these provisions. Moreover, the state's pa1tial funding of integrated 
schools infringes the rights of both children and guardians whose beliefs accord with 
those adhered to by the school, and those whose beliefs do not. Because of the 
unambiguous wording of the relevant legislative provisions, these p1ima facie 
breaches are all saved by section 4 of the BORA: both the state and school boards are 
operating within the law. Yet this finding does not signal the end of the matter. The 
couits can issue declarations that the legislative provisions are themselves 
inconsistent with the BORA. 
In order to issue such a declaration, the cou1ts must be satisfied under section 
5 that the prima facie breach is not justified in a free and democratic society - an 
enquiry that necessarily involves value judgments. The cornerstone value adopted by 
this paper is that inspired by the liberal theorist Will Kymlicka. To exercise trne 
autonomy, Kymlicka maintains , individuals must have access to their own culture. 
For all children whose religion fonns an intrinsic part of their culture, access to 
religious schools is therefore necessaiy in order to render meaningful the life options 
from which they can choose. Yet just as great care must be exercised to ensure that 
majoritarian values are not imposed on social minorities, New Zealand's liberal-
democratic framework requires that children are not trapped within their culture. 
Thus, while the state has an obligation to fully fund religious schools that consent to 
integrate into the state system, it is justified in limiting integration only to those 
schools that expose children to an 'objective' or 'c1itical' mindset. 
If this proposal is implemented, it will give rise to an education system in 
which culturally and religiously approp1iate education is available to all. Such a 
finding has important implications for the matter of whethet· religious instruction and 
observances are justified in state schools. Once the interests of those whose religion is 
integral to their culture are accommodated, the strongest argument for allowing 
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religious activities in state schools is addressed. If the cultural needs of religious 
groups are met by fully funding integrated schools, then their interests cannot justify 
infringing upon those of children and guardians who do not share their beliefs. In the 
absence of an alternative justification, religious instruction and observances should be 
prohibited in state schools. 
Ultimately, then, the question of whether God should be expelled from New 
Zealand schools receives a bifurcated answer. On the one hand, religious instruction 
and observances ought to be excluded from state schools. On the other hand, such 
activities should be allowed in prescribed circumstances in integrated schools, and the 
viability of those schools ensured through full funding. In this way, the state can best 
ensure the promotion of individual autonomy in a diverse society. 
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